Negotiation Games

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A01=David Ethan Milstein
A01=David H. McElreath
A01=Michelle E. Waldron
A01=Ronald J. Quarles
A01=Steven Brams
advanced negotiation strategies in game theory
Appraisal Procedure
arbitration methods
Arbitrator's Judgment
Arbitrator's Position
Arbitrator’s Judgment
Arbitrator’s Position
Author_David Ethan Milstein
Author_David H. McElreath
Author_Michelle E. Waldron
Author_Ronald J. Quarles
Author_Steven Brams
Banzhaf Index
bargaining theory
bonus
Bonus Procedure
Breakdown Strategy
Category=KJN
Conventional Arbitration
crisis bargaining analysis
CV
Deterrent Threat
Dominant Strategy
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
equilibrium
Expected Profit
Game Tree
Israelite Spies
legislative negotiation
matrix
Minimal Majority
Minimal Winning
nash
Nash Equilibrium
nonmyopic
Nonmyopic Equilibrium
payoff
Penalty Procedure
prices
procedure
rational choice modelling
reservation
Reservation Prices
strategic decision making
threat
Threat Outcome
Threat Power
Threat Strategy
Tie Breaking Vote
Vote Trading
Voting Body

Product details

  • ISBN 9780415308953
  • Weight: 600g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 26 Dec 2002
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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The concept of negotiation is critical to coping with all manner of strategic problems that arise in the everyday dealings that people have with each other and organizations. Game theory illustrates this to the full and shows how these problems can be solved.
This is a revised edition of a classic book and uses some wonderfully adroit case studies that remain relevant today. Negotiation Games covers such themes as:

· trade offs and the game of chicken
· the effects of power in the cease-fire game
· the use of threat power in sequential games
· fallback bargaining and rational negotiation.

Written by one of the leading game theorists of the generation, this book will be greatly appreciated not only by academics and students involved in game theory, economics, business and international relations, but also by those involved in diplomacy and international business.

Steven Brams, Ronald J. Quarles, David H. McElreath, Michelle E. Waldron, David Ethan Milstein

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