New Directions in Market Design

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Ahunbay
ai
allocate
allocation
alvin
Arnesen
articifial
auction
Aurelie
Bichler
billy
buyer
Cantillon
Category=KC
Category=KCA
Category=KCB
Category=KCH
choice
clear
climate
compatible
computational
compute
design
donate
donation
education
efficient
electricity
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_new_release
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Estelle
Fanyin
Ferguson
G
healthcare
hospital
Ilya
incentive
intelligence
Irene
Johannes
Knorr
lennerster
Leyton-Brow
Lo
matching
mediate
Mete
Milgrom
multi-agent
Neal
Newman
nmez
organ
Ostrovsk
Parag
Pathak
Paul
price
problem
program
Rachel
radio
reallocation
residency
resource
ROot
roth
school
Segal
seller
Seref
signal
Slechten
So
spectrum
Tayfun
tool
transparency
transparent
Unver
Utku
William
Yua
Zheng

Product details

  • ISBN 9780226846590
  • Weight: 481g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 24 Feb 2026
  • Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Hardback
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A comprehensive survey of the evolution of market design over the past three decades.

In the mid-1990s, the first Federal Communications Commission spectrum auction and the redesign of the National Residency Matching Program collectively helped to jumpstart the field of market design. Since then, extensive research has improved auction design and broken new conceptual ground in addressing multi-agent matching problems. This volume summarizes key discoveries and advances in market design over the past three decades and explores contemporary challenges—from climate policy and electricity markets to AI-mediated exchanges and hospital resource allocation.

Contributors examine how to design efficient, incentive-compatible mechanisms that are robust to shifting conditions and increasing complexity. They consider a wide variety of applications that could benefit from the market design viewpoint, such as environmental markets, school choice, and organ exchange. Together, the chapters illustrate the important interactions between economic theory, computational tools, and institutional insight.

Irene Lo is assistant professor of management science and engineering at Stanford University. Michael Ostrovsky is the Fred H. Merrill Professor of Economics at Stanford Graduate School of Business and a research associate of the NBER. Parag A. Pathak is the Class of 1922 Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he is also the founder and director of Blueprint Labs, and a research associate of the NBER.