Normativity and the Problem of Representation

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Authority
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Category=QDTK
Category=QDTQ
Conceptual Role Semantics
Declarative Sentences
disagreement in evaluative language
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Error Theorists
Ethics
Evaluative facts
Evaluative Status
Expressivism
expressivist theory
Genuine Disagreement
Genuine Moral Disagreement
inferentialism
Metaethical Expressivism
metaethics
Moral Assertions
Moral Claims
Moral Concepts
Moral Error Theory
moral philosophy
Moral Predicates
Moral Properties
Morality
Non-cognitive Attitude
Non-descriptivism
Non-natural Properties
non-naturalist ethics
Non-naturalist Moral Realism
Non-naturalist Realism
Noncognitive Attitudes
Normative
normative claims
Normative facts
normativity
pragmatism
Priori Entailment
Property Individuation
Relativism
representation business
Representational Content
Representational Purport
Robustly Normative
semantic relativism
Supervenience
Truth Conditional Semantics
Vice Versa

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367353926
  • Weight: 790g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 23 Jul 2019
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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This book tackles questions which revolve around the representational purport (or lack thereof) of evaluative and normative claims.

Claims about what we ought to do, what is best, what is justified, or simply what counts as a good reason for action—in other words, evaluative or normative claims—are familiar. But when we pause to ask what these claims mean and what we are doing when we use them, puzzles arise. Are there facts of the matter about what ought to be done, much like there are facts of the matter about mathematics or the natural world? If so, "ought claims" are probably trying to represent the "ought facts". Alternatively, perhaps there are no evaluative facts, in which case evaluative claims are either trying to represent facts which do not exist, or evaluative claims are not in the representation business to begin with. The latter option is intriguing, and it is the subject of much recent work in expressivism, pragmatism, and semantic relativism. But if ought claims are not representing anything as factual, why do we think such claims are true or false, and what are we doing when we disagree with one another about them? This book sheds light on this important area of philosophy.

This book was originally published as a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

Matthew S. Bedke is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia, Canada. He specializes in meta-ethics and meta-normativity and his work addresses topics such as the nature and psychology of normativity, debunking arguments in ethics, and motivational internalism.

Stefan Sciaraffa is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at McMaster University, Canada. He specializes in political philosophy, the philosophy of law, and metaethics. His work addresses the institutional structures, attitudes, behaviours, practical reasoning, and discourse that constitute relationships of political community.