Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent

Regular price €179.80
A01=Matthew Jones
ABM System
Anglo-American collaboration
arms control debates
Author_Matthew Jones
Ballistic Missile Defence
ballistic missile systems
Blue Streak
Blue Streak Cancellation
British defence policy
British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group
British politics
Category=JWMN
Cold War military strategy
De Gaulle
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Future Policy Study
Independent Deterrent
independent nuclear force evolution
MRBM Force
Nassau Agreement
NATO Minister
NATO Nuclear
NATO Nuclear Force
nuclear deterrence
nuclear weapons development
Penetration Aids
Polaris
Re
Royal Navy
Sary Shagan
UK Deterrent
UK Force
UK Nuclear
UK Nuclear Force
UK Nuclear Policy
UK Polaris
UK Polaris Force
UK's Possession
UK’s Possession
V-Bomber
Western Deterrent

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138674936
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 11 May 2017
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
Delivery/Collection within 10-20 working days

Our Delivery Time Frames Explained
2-4 Working Days: Available in-stock

10-20 Working Days: On Backorder

Will Deliver When Available: On Pre-Order or Reprinting

We ship your order once all items have arrived at our warehouse and are processed. Need those 2-4 day shipping items sooner? Just place a separate order for them!

Volume I of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British government’s strategic nuclear policy from 1945 to 1964.

Written with full access to the UK documentary record, this volume examines how British governments after 1945 tried to build and then maintain an independent, nationally controlled strategic nuclear capability, and the debates this provoked in official circles. Against a background of evolving British ideas about deterrence during the Cold War, it focuses on the strategic, political and diplomatic considerations that compelled governments, in the face of ever-increasing pressures on the defence budget, to persist in their efforts to develop nuclear weapons and to deploy a credible nuclear force, as the age of the manned bomber gave way to the ballistic missile. Particular attention is given to controversies over the portion of the defence budget devoted to the deterrent programme, the effects of the restoration of Anglo-American nuclear collaboration after 1958, increasing reliance on the United States for nuclear delivery systems, the negotiations that led to the Nassau Agreement of 1962 and the supply of Polaris, and discussions within the Western Alliance over the control of nuclear forces. By the time of the October 1964 election, when this volume concludes, previous dismissal of the prospects for successful ballistic missile defence were giving way to growing doubts over the long-term effectiveness of the Polaris system in its role as an independent deterrent, several years before it was due to enter service with the Royal Navy.

This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, Cold War history, nuclear proliferation and international relations.

Matthew Jones is Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and author of, amongst other books, After Hiroshima: The United States, Race, and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945–1965 (2010).