On Justifying Moral Judgements (Routledge Revivals)

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A01=Lawrence C. Becker
Activity Calculative Valuation
Author_Lawrence C. Becker
Axiological Scheme
Bad Hammer
Built Ins
Calculative Valuation
Category=NH
Category=QDHR
Category=QDTQ
Causal Hypothesis
Ceteris Paribus Clauses
Conduct Option
Deontic Responsibility
Determinist Thesis
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eq_history
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eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Good Man
Good Man Judgments
Grounding Problem
Indefinite Regress
Justification Procedures
Moral Character Traits
Moral Scepticism
Non-moral Judgments
Presumptive Criteria
Purposive Criterion
Rational Justification Procedure
Responsible Agency Statements
Substantive Moral Theory
Vice Versa
Violate

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138015944
  • Weight: 530g
  • Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
  • Publication Date: 04 Dec 2013
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited.

The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination of the three main approaches to moral theory: axiology, deontology, and agent morality. A pluralistic account of the concept of value is expounded, and a solution to the problem of ultimate justification is suggested. Analyses of valuation, evaluation, the ‘is-ought’ issue, and the concepts of obligation, responsibility and the good person are all incorporated into the main line of argument.

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