On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects
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A01=Caspar Hare
Abductive reasoning
Ambiguity
Analogy
Author_Caspar Hare
C. D. Broad
Category=QDTJ
Category=QDTK
Category=QDTQ
Concept
Consciousness
Consequentialism
Consideration
Contradiction
Counterexample
Criticism
De se
Egocentric presentism
Egocentrism
Epistemic possibility
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Ethical egoism
Existentialism
Explanation
Falsity
Feeling
Four-dimensionalism
G. E. Moore
Hedonism
Humility
Hypothesis
Imagination
Indigestion
Inference
Intelligibility (philosophy)
Introspection
Matter of fact
Mental exercise
Metaphor
Modal realism
Moral nihilism
Morality
Multitude
Nostril
Obstacle
Ontology
Pain and pleasure
Personal identity
Philosopher
Philosophy
Philosophy of language
Possible world
Precedent
Presentism (literary and historical analysis)
Principia Ethica
Problem of other minds
Psychology
Qualia
Ralph Nader
Reason
Reductionism
Result
Self-concept
Self-consciousness
Self-interest
Semantics
Simultaneity
Skepticism
Solipsism
Stuttering
Theory
Thought
Thought experiment
Truth condition
Wishful thinking
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Product details
- ISBN 9780691178035
- Dimensions: 140 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 21 Nov 2017
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Caspar Hare makes an original and compelling case for "egocentric presentism," a view about the nature of first-person experience, about what happens when we see things from our own particular point of view. A natural thought about our first-person experience is that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present to me." Hare, however, goes one step further and claims, counterintuitively, that the thought should instead be that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present." There is, in other words, something unique about me and the things of which I am aware. On Myself and Other, Less Important Subjects represents a new take on an old view, known as solipsism, which maintains that people's experiences give them grounds for believing that they have a special, distinguished place in the world--for example, believing that only they exist or that other people do not have conscious minds like their own. Few contemporary thinkers have taken solipsism seriously.
But Hare maintains that the version of solipsism he argues for is in indeed defensible, and that it is uniquely capable of resolving some seemingly intractable philosophical problems--both in metaphysics and ethics--concerning personal identity over time, as well as the tension between self-interest and the greater good. This formidable and tightly argued defense of a seemingly absurd view is certain to provoke debate.
Caspar John Hare is associate professor of philosophy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
