Optimal Imperfection?
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A01=David M. Rocke
A01=George W. Downs
Adventurism
Air pollution
Anecdotal evidence
Asset specificity
Author_David M. Rocke
Author_George W. Downs
Bargaining
Bilateral trade
Bribery
Brinkmanship
Business ethics
Calculation
Category=JPQB
Category=JPS
Collusion
Common-pool resource
Defection
Deterrence (legal)
Deterrence theory
Disaster
Distrust
Economic efficiency
Economic potential
Endowment effect
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Escape clause
Free rider problem
Free trade
Great power
Inference
Information asymmetry
Institution
International relations
Level playing field
Loss aversion
Misrepresentation
Moral hazard
Motion of no confidence
Nash equilibrium
Non-tariff barriers to trade
Nontariff Barrier
Oligopoly
Opportunity cost
Original intent
Overproduction
Pareto efficiency
Preventive war
Principal-agent problem
Prisoner's dilemma
Professional liability insurance
Prospect theory
Protectionism
Rational choice theory
Real versus nominal value (economics)
Redress
Regime theory
Regional integration
Result
Risk aversion
Shortage
Slippery slope
Speculation
Subsidy
Superiority (short story)
Tariff
Trade barrier
Trade restriction
Trade war
Trade-off
Treaty
Trigger strategy
Uncertainty
Unilateralism
Utility
Voluntary export restraints
Product details
- ISBN 9780691016252
- Weight: 312g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 06 Mar 1997
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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"Domestic politics matters" has become a rallying cry for international relations scholars over the past decade, yet the question still remains: Just how does it matter? In this book, George Downs and David Rocke argue that an important part of the international impact of domestic politics springs from the institutional responses to its many uncertainties. This impact is due not so much to the errors in judgment these uncertainties can cause as to the strategic and institutional consequences of knowing that such errors are possible. The heart of the book is its formal analysis of how three kinds of domestic uncertainty have shaped international relations through their influence on three very different institutions. One chapter deals with the decision rules that citizens create to cope with uncertainty about the quality of their representation, and how these can lead to the paradoxical "gambling for resurrection" effect. Another chapter describes the extent to which the weak enforcement provisions of GATT can be understood as a mechanism to cope with uncertain but intermittent interest group demands for protection.
The third chapter looks at the impact of uncertainty on the creation, survival, and membership of multilateral regulatory institutions, such as the Montreal Protocol and EU, when some states question the capacity of other states to meet their treaty obligations.
George W. Downs is the Professor of World Politics of Peace and War in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. David M. Rocke is Professor in the Graduate School of Management and the Graduate Group in Statistics at the University of California, Davis. Downs and Rocke are the coauthors of Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control.
