Our Money

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A01=Leah Downey
Accountability
Action
Administrative
Administrative State
Assets
Author_Leah Downey
Bank for International Settlements
Bankers
Bureaucratic autonomy
Category=JPA
Category=JPHV
Category=KCBM
Category=KCP
Category=KCZ
Central
Central Bank
Central Bank Independence
Choice
Congress
Constitutionalizing
Creation
Credit allocation
Credit policy
Delegation
Democracy
Democratic
Democratic Deficit
Depoliticization
Domestic
Dominance
Economic
Economy
Effective
Electoral Business Cycle
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Federal
Federal reserve
Financial
Fiscal
Good Governance
Governance
Government
Guardrails
Humphrey Hawkins
Independence
Independent Agency
Inflation
Infrastructural power
Institutions
Interest rates
Iterative
Leah Rose Ely Downey
Legislative
Legislature
Macroeconomic
Mandate
Market
Monetary
Monetary Policy Neutrality
Monetary policymaking
Money
Nation
Officials
Our Money: Monetary Policy As If Democracy Mattered
Policy
Policymakers
Politics
Power
Price
Price stability
Private credit
Regime
Reserve
Reserve Requirements
Rule
Stability
Transparency

Product details

  • ISBN 9780691244433
  • Dimensions: 156 x 235mm
  • Publication Date: 10 Dec 2024
  • Publisher: Princeton University Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Hardback
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How the creation of money and monetary policy can be more democratic

The power to create money is foundational to the state. In the United States, that power has been largely delegated to private banks governed by an independent central bank. Putting monetary policy in the hands of a set of insulated, nonelected experts has fueled the popular rejection of expertise as well as a widespread dissatisfaction with democratically elected officials. In Our Money, Leah Downey makes a principled case against central bank independence (CBI) by both challenging the economic theory behind it and developing a democratic rationale for sustaining the power of the legislature to determine who can create money and on what terms. How states govern money creation has an impact on the capacity of the people and their elected officials to steer policy over time. In a healthy democracy, Downey argues, the balance of power over money creation matters.

Downey applies and develops democratic theory through an exploration of monetary policy. In so doing, she develops a novel theory of independent agencies in the context of democratic government, arguing that states can employ expertise without being ruled by experts. Downey argues that it is through iterative governance, the legislature knowing and regularly showing its power over policy, that the people can retain their democratic power to guide policy in the modern state. As for contemporary macroeconomic arguments in defense of central bank independence, Downey suggests that the purported economic benefits do not outweigh the democratic costs.

Leah Downey is junior research fellow at St. John’s College, Cambridge, and a coeditor of A Political Economy of Justice.

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