Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism

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A01=Mark Walker
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ancient skepticism
Author_Mark Walker
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Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=HPK
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Category=QDTK
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Category=QDTS
conservativism
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disagreement
Dogmatism
epistemic hubris
epistemic humility
epistemic superiority
epistemology
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ethics & morality
hubris
Language_English
liberalism
libertarianism
noetic skepticism
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philosophy of religion
political morality
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Pyrrhonism
socialism
Socrates
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Way of Life

Product details

  • ISBN 9781666918885
  • Weight: 603g
  • Dimensions: 159 x 239mm
  • Publication Date: 11 Dec 2023
  • Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Hardback
  • Language: English
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The ancient Pyrrhonian skeptics suspended judgment about all philosophical views. Their main opponents were the Dogmatists—those who believed their preferred philosophical views. In Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism: On Disbelieving Our Philosophical Views, Mark Walker argues, contra Pyrrhonians and Dogmatists, for a “darker” skepticism: that we should disbelieve our philosophical views. On the question of political morality, for example, we should disbelieve libertarianism, conservativism, socialism, liberalism, and any alternative ideologies. Since most humans have philosophical beliefs, such as about religious and political matters, humanity writ large should disbelieve their preferred philosophical views. Walker argues that Skeptical-Dogmatism permits a more realistic estimation of our epistemic powers. Dogmatists who believe their view is correct, while believing that two or more competing views are false, must—at least implicitly—take themselves to be “über epistemic superiors” to their disagreeing colleagues. Such a self-assessment is as implausible as it is hubristic. Skeptical-Dogmatism, in contrast, permits a more realistic and humbler epistemic self-conception. Walker also shows that there are no insuperable practical difficulties in living as a Skeptical-Dogmatist.
Mark Walker is professor in the philosophy department at New Mexico State University.

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