Partiality and Impartiality in African Philosophy
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A01=M. Molefe
African ethics
African studies
Author_M. Molefe
Category=JP
Category=QDHH
Common good
communitarianism
cosmopolitanism
cultural studies
Dignity
Egalitarianism
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
equality
ethical theory
ethics
Ethics of Personhood
favoritism
Impartiality
Kwame Gyekye
Kwasi Wiredu
metaethics
moral philosophy
Partiality
personhood
political science
political theory
politics
solidarity
Thaddeus Metz
ubuntu
value theory
Product details
- ISBN 9781498599436
- Weight: 522g
- Dimensions: 159 x 229mm
- Publication Date: 10 Nov 2021
- Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
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Partiality and Impartiality in African Philosophy fills the lacuna in African philosophy literature on the inherent tension between requirements of partiality (favoritism) and impartiality (equality). Motsamai Molefe deploys two strategies to philosophically resolve the tension between partiality and impartiality. The first strategy involves applying the moral theories of Kwasi Wiredu, Thaddeus Metz, and Kwame Gyekye to the problem. Finding their views useful in some ways and seriously limited in others, Molefe turns to the second strategy in which he invokes the salient normative concept of personhood in African cultures. Molefe argues that the concept of personhood adjoins theories of human dignity and moral perfection (virtue). The major insight that emerges is a robust ethical theory qua personhood that accommodates both partiality and impartiality. He grounds requirements of impartiality on human dignity, which operates largely as a macro-ethical concept that normatively informs the character of our social institutions (politics). Politics is characterized by fairness, equality, and impartiality. Partiality (the agent-and-other-centred forms of it) is directly connected with the agent’s chief moral duty to achieve her own virtue (moral perfection), which operates as a micro-ethical concept. These two kinds of moral partialism, self-favoritism and close ties such as family, are justified by appeal to the project's view, instead of the individuals-and-relationships view typically invoked to justify moral partiality in the literature.
M. Molefe is senior researcher at the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa (CLEA), at the University of Fort Hare.
