Paying for the Party

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A01=Michael R. Kistner
Author_Michael R. Kistner
campaign
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congress
constituent
corrupt
democrat
donor
election
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experience
federal
finance
forthcoming
government
knowledge
law
legislate
legislation
lobbying
lobbyist
making
money
outreach
parties
policy
productivity
representation
republican
responsive
rich
senate
service
state
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Product details

  • ISBN 9780226850207
  • Weight: 454g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 19 Jun 2026
  • Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Hardback
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A revealing, data-rich exploration of how American legislators transformed from active policymakers into party fundraisers.

Lawmakers in Congress and state legislatures across the United States spend enormous amounts of time and effort fundraising, not just for their own seats but for the party. Whether dialing for dollars or hosting high-priced fundraising events, the pursuit of campaign funds is now a massive part of the American legislator’s job description. What explains this transformation, and what are the consequences for public policy?

In Paying for the Party, Michael Kistner uses new theory and new data to answer these questions. He shows that state legislative party organizations—Democratic and Republican caucuses in capitols across the country—are responsible for turning their members into single-minded seekers of money. Parties reward legislators who contribute the most with powerful leadership and committee positions. Consequently, the members who now hold these agenda-setting positions are increasingly neither the most productive nor knowledgeable lawmakers, but rather those who can raise the most money. And when legislators are asked to raise more money, they skip committee hearings for fundraising events, enacting fewer substantive policies as a result. Paying for the Party shows that parties in contemporary American legislatures have hollowed out the policymaking capacity of their institutions and empowered a decidedly non-representative set of legislators.

Michael Kistner is assistant professor of political science at the University of Houston. His research has appeared in The Journal of Politics, The Quarterly Journal of Political Science, and The Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy.

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