1948 Palestine war
A01=Virginia Page Fortna
Appeasement
Arab-Israeli conflict
Arbitration
Armistice
Arms control
Author_Virginia Page Fortna
Azad Kashmir
Belligerent
Blockade
Brinkmanship
Case study
Casus belli
Category=GTU
Category=JPS
Ceasefire
Combatant
Decisive victory
Decolonization
Defection
Democratic peace theory
Diktat
Disarmament
Dispute resolution
Embargo
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Falklands War
Great power
Hazard ratio
India-Pakistan relations
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
Insurgency
Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir
International relations
John Mearsheimer
Kashmir conflict
Liaquat Ali Khan
Liberation Struggle
Limited war
Militarized interstate dispute
Military occupation
Mutual assured destruction
Nuclear warfare
Obstacle
Pakistan
Peace and conflict studies
Peace treaty
Peacekeeping
Power vacuum
Preemptive war
Preventive war
Prisoner of war
Rebuttal
Relative gain (international relations)
Reprisal
Result
Salami tactics
Secession
Security assurance
Security dilemma
Shuttle diplomacy
Strategic depth
Tashkent Declaration
Territorial integrity
Total war
Uncertainty
Unconditional surrender
United Nations peacekeeping
War
War crime
War of Attrition
War-weariness
Warfare
Yom Kippur War
Product details
- ISBN 9780691115122
- Weight: 369g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 21 Mar 2004
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Why do cease-fire agreements sometimes last for years while others flounder barely long enough to be announced? How to maintain peace in the aftermath of war is arguably one of the most important questions of the post--Cold War era. And yet it is one of the least explored issues in the study of war and peace. Here, Page Fortna offers the first comprehensive analysis of why cease-fires between states succeed or fail. She develops cooperation theory to argue that mechanisms within these agreements can help maintain peace by altering the incentives for war and peace, reducing uncertainty, and helping to prevent or manage accidents that could lead to war. To test this theory, the book first explores factors, such as decisive victory and prior history of conflict, that affect the baseline prospects for peace. It then considers whether stronger cease-fires are likely to be implemented in the hardest or the easiest cases. Next, through both quantitative and qualitative testing of the effects of cease-fire agreements, firm evidence emerges that agreements do matter.
Durable peace is harder to achieve after some wars than others, but when most difficult, states usually invest more in peace building. These efforts work. Strong agreements markedly lessen the risk of further war. Mechanisms such as demilitarized zones, dispute resolution commissions, peacekeeping, and external guarantees can help maintain peace between even the deadliest of foes.
Virginia Page Fortna is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University.
