A01=Nathan A Pelcovits
Air Transport Unit
Antiaircraft Guns
Arab Israeli Fronts
Armed Elements
Author_Nathan A Pelcovits
Beirut Area
Category=GTM
Category=JP
comparative peacekeeping effectiveness
conflict resolution strategies
Defense Minister Ezer Weizman
Demilitarized Zone
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eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Gemayel Government
Golan Settlements
High Threat Area
international relations theory
Israeli Military Presence
Israeli Security Concerns
Israeli Security Zone
Kiryat Shemona
Lebanese Army
Limited Forces Zones
Middle East conflict studies
military intervention analysis
multinational peacekeeping forces
non-U.N. multinational operation
PLO Fighter
PLO Guerrilla
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
Sabra-Shatila massacre
Sinai Desert
Sinai peace-keeping force
Sole Assignments
UNEF Ii
UNIFIL Mandate
UNIFIL Mission
United Nations operations
Product details
- ISBN 9780367282523
- Weight: 385g
- Dimensions: 144 x 229mm
- Publication Date: 13 Sep 2019
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
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Since 1948, the United Nations has sponsored virtually every third party peacekeeping mission on Arab· Israeli fronts. Three recent events, however, have been responsible for significantly altering the pattern of peacekeeping in the region: the Camp David accords, which, because they were opposed in the U.N. by the Soviet Union and most Arab nations, prevented U.N. sponsorship of a Sinai peacekeeping force; the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, during which the U.N. Interim Force was made to look ineffectual; and the Sabra-Shatila massacres in South Beirut three months later, which prompted the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force. Dr.Pelcovits analyzes these events to answer the questions they raise about peacekeeping in the Middle East: What advantages are afforded by U.N. peacekeepers compared with non-U.N. missions? What net benefits are derived from American participation in a non-U.N. multinational operation? And how do they compare to the classic U.N. peacekeeping rationale of insulating disputed areas from super power confrontation? Finally, what determines the success of such operations-geopolitical circumstance or institutional affiliation?
Nathan A. Pelcovits is a professorial lecturer at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of Security Guarantees in a Middle East Settlement (1976).
