Peirce on Inference

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Product details

  • ISBN 9780197689066
  • Weight: 662g
  • Dimensions: 237 x 163mm
  • Publication Date: 29 Aug 2023
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press Inc
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Hardback
  • Language: English
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Above all other titles, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) prized that of logician. He thought of logic broadly, such that it includes not merely formal logic but an examination of the entire process of inquiry. His works are replete with detailed investigations into logical questions. Peirce is especially concerned to show that valid inferential processes, diligently followed, will eventually root out error and alight on the truth. Peirce on Inference draws together diverse strands from Peirce's lifelong reflections on logic in order to develop a comprehensive perspective on Peirce's theory of inference. Peirce argues that each genus of inference--deduction, induction, and abduction--has a different truth-producing virtue. An inference is valid just in case the procedure used in fact has the truth-producing virtue claimed for it and the person making the inference adheres to the procedure. In successive chapters, this book shows how Peirce supports the thesis that these genera of inference have the truth-producing virtues claimed for them and how Peirce responds to objections. Among the objections given consideration are the liar paradox, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's new riddle of induction, that this may be a chance world, and that we are incapable of conceiving the true hypothesis. The book defends several controversial theses, including that Peirce does not so strongly object to Bayesianism as is sometimes claimed and that prior to 1900 Peirce had no explicit theory of abduction. It also proposes a novel account of abduction.
Richard Kenneth Atkins is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Boston College. He is author of Charles S. Peirce's Phenomenology (2018), Peirce and the Conduct of Life (2016), and Puzzled?! (2015). He is co-editor of Peirce on Perception and Reasoning (2017). His articles have appeared in Synthese, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, European Journal of Philosophy, and History and Philosophy of Logic, among other venues. He previously served as Executive Director of the Charles S. Peirce Society.

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