People's War (RLE Modern East and South East Asia)

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A01=J.L.S. Girling
Author_J.L.S. Girling
Category=GTM
Category=JP
Category=JWA
Category=NHF
Category=NHW
China's Revolutionary War
China’s Revolutionary War
Chinese Communist Party
Chingkang Mountains
chinh
Chu Teh
communist
counterinsurgency strategies
diem
Diem Regime
eq_bestseller
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Evil Gentry
Hamlet Evaluation System
HAN
insurgency studies
malayan
Mao Tsetung
Nguyen Ai Quoc
Nguyen Thai
north
North Vietnamese
party
peasant revolts
Peng Teh Huai
People's Armed Forces
People’s Armed Forces
political mobilisation
Protracted War
regime
revolutionary movements
RLE
rural uprising analysis
Selected Works
South Vietnam
South Vietnamese
Southeast Asian conflict
Souvanna Phouma
Strategic Hamlet Programme
Strategic Hamlets
truong
Truong Chinh
United States Relations
vietnam
vietnamese
Young Men

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138892637
  • Weight: 521g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 15 Apr 2015
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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This book, first published in 1969, casts a critical eye over the problem of insurgency. The author sees insurgency not just as a matter of technique – military tactics or organizational skill – nor as the result of ‘force and fraud’, but as ‘people’s war’: the conditions in which the mass of the people become involved, voluntarily or otherwise, on either side. He quotes Nasution’s statement, ‘The guerrilla movement is only the result, not the cause of the problem’. People’s war brings the peasantry, hitherto ignorant, apathetic or rejected, into the political process. For ‘war is … the continuation of politics by other means’. In Asia this was essentially a peasant’s war, arising when peasant grievances, interests or demands cannot be met under the existing ‘legitimate’ but urban or landowner-orientated system of rule. It shows little understanding to blame outside intervention when peasant – and nationalist – unrest leads to revolt. The Chinese Communists did not owe success to Soviet aid, the Vietminh to Chinese assistance or the Vietcong to North Vietnamese intervention. The conclusion applies to governments as to insurgents: no amount of outside aid can win the war for them if they themselves are incapable and the people – on whom they depend for support – have no will to fight. This book, based on first-hand experience of the area and on study of original sources, offers (1) an analysis of ‘people’s war’ in China, Indochina and Vietnam, (2) a critique of US policy in Laos and Vietnam and (3) a comparison with counter-measures in Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia. It is both original and constructive.

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