Physicalism, or Something Near Enough
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A01=Jaegwon Kim
Abductive reasoning
Anomalous monism
Antireductionism
Argument
Author_Jaegwon Kim
Barry Loewer
Cambridge University Press
Category=QDTM
Causal chain
Causal closure
Causality
Cognitive science
Concept
Consciousness
Cosmological argument
David Chalmers
Double-aspect theory
Downward causation
Dualism (philosophy of mind)
Eliminative materialism
Emergence
Emergentism
Epiphenomenalism
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Existence
Explanandum
Explanation
Explanatory gap
Hard problem of consciousness
Hilary Putnam
Hypothesis
Instance (computer science)
Ipso facto
Lecture
Materialism
Mental event
Mental property
Molecule
Multiple realizability
Ned Block
Neurophysiology
Ontology
Overdetermination
Phenomenon
Philosopher
Philosophical Studies
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of science
Physical law
Physical property
Physicalism
Prediction
Premise
Prima facie
Problem of mental causation
Property dualism
Qualia
Rationality
Reality
Reason
Reductionism
Requirement
Scientist
Special sciences
Suggestion
Supervenience
Theoretical physics
Theory
Thomas Nagel
Thought
Type physicalism
Working hypothesis
Product details
- ISBN 9780691133850
- Weight: 255g
- Dimensions: 140 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 23 Dec 2007
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind have largely been shaped by physicalism, the doctrine that all phenomena are ultimately physical. Here, Jaegwon Kim presents the most comprehensive and systematic presentation yet of his influential ideas on the mind-body problem. He seeks to determine, after half a century of debate: What kind of (or "how much") physicalism can we lay claim to? He begins by laying out mental causation and consciousness as the two principal challenges to contemporary physicalism. How can minds exercise their causal powers in a physical world? Is a physicalist account of consciousness possible? The book's starting point is the "supervenience" argument (sometimes called the "exclusion" argument), which Kim reformulates in an extended defense. This argument shows that the contemporary physicalist faces a stark choice between reductionism (the idea that mental phenomena are physically reducible) and epiphenomenalism (the view that mental phenomena are causally impotent). Along the way, Kim presents a novel argument showing that Cartesian substance dualism offers no help with mental causation.
Mind-body reduction, therefore, is required to save mental causation. But are minds physically reducible? Kim argues that all but one type of mental phenomena are reducible, including intentional mental phenomena, such as beliefs and desires. The apparent exceptions are the intrinsic, felt qualities of conscious experiences ("qualia"). Kim argues, however, that certain relational properties of qualia, in particular their similarities and differences, are behaviorally manifest and hence in principle reducible, and that it is these relational properties of qualia that are central to their cognitive roles. The causal efficacy of qualia, therefore, is not entirely lost. According to Kim, then, while physicalism is not the whole truth, it is the truth near enough.
Jaegwon Kim is William Herbert Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. His previous books include "Mind in a Physical World, Philosophy of Mind," and "Supervenience and Mind".
