Pivotal Politics – A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking
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A01=Keith Krehbiel
across the aisle
Author_Keith Krehbiel
bill
bipartisanship
branches
Category=JPH
Category=LAB
Category=LN
checks and balances
coalition
compromise
congress
courts
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
executive
filibuster
government
gridlock
lawmaking
legislation
legislative
nonfiction
partisanship
political science
politics
presidential power
productivity
separation of powers
supermajority
veto
vote
Product details
- ISBN 9780226452722
- Weight: 580g
- Dimensions: 164 x 228mm
- Publication Date: 22 Jun 1998
- Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Politicians and pundits alike have complained that the divided governments of the last decades have led to a legislative gridlock. The author argues against this, advancing the theory that divided government actually has little effect on legislative productivity. Gridlock is in fact the order of the day, occurring even when the same party controls the legislative and executive branches. Anchored to real politics, the author argues that the pivotal vote on a piece of legislation is not the one that gives a bill simple majority, but the vote that allows its supporters to override a possible presidential veto. This theory of pivots also explains why, when bills are passed, winning coalitions usually are bipartisan and supermajority sized. Offering an account of when gridlock is overcome and showing that political parties are less important in legislative-executive politics than previously thought, this text offers a perspective on American lawmaking.
