Political Economy of Government Auditing

Regular price €204.60
Quantity:
Ships in 10-20 days
Delivery/Collection within 10-20 working days
Shipping & Delivery
A01=Carlos Santiso
administrative law reform
agency
Algemene Rekenkamer
ante
Ante Control
anti-corruption strategies
Ar Ag
Audit Findings
audit institutions
Author_Carlos Santiso
budget
Category=GTP
Category=KCM
Category=KCP
Central Budget Offices
CGR
comparative audit agency effectiveness
control
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
external
External Audit
External Audit Agency
External Audit Systems
External Auditing
External Auditing Function
finance
fiscal
Fiscal Control
fiscal oversight mechanisms
Government Financial Management
Government Public Accounts
Horizontal Accountability
Latin American governance
management
Oversight Agencies
Pe Ci
Performance Auditing
process
Pu Es
public
Public Administration
Public Finance Management
public sector accountability
Public Sector Governance
Single Member Districts
TCU
Tr Ac

Product details

  • ISBN 9780415477734
  • Weight: 540g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 22 May 2009
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
Secure checkout Fast Shipping Easy returns

The Political Economy of Government Auditing addresses the elusive quest for greater transparency and accountability in the management of public finances in emerging economies; and, more specifically, it examines the contribution of autonomous audit agencies (AAAs) to the fight against corruption and waste. Whilst the role of audit agencies in curbing corruption is increasingly acknowledged, there exists little comparative work on their institutional effectiveness. Addressing the performance of AAAs in emerging economies, Carlos Santiso pursues a political economy perspective that addresses the context in which audit agencies are embedded, and the governance factors that make them work or fail. Here, the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Chile are examined, as they illustrate the three – parliamentary, court and independent – models of AAAs in modern states, and their three distinct trajectories of reform, or lack of reform. Beyond Latin America, considerations on the reform of government auditing in other countries, developed and developing are also taken up as, it is argued, while institutional arrangements for government auditing matter, political factors ultimately determine the effectiveness of AAAs. Reforming AAAs, it is concluded, must consider the trajectory of state building, the role of law in public administration and the quality of governance.

An important contribution to the comparative study of governance institutions, and especially those tasked with overseeing the budget and curbing corruption, The Political Economy of Government Auditing will be of interest to scholars and students of comparative politics, development studies, administrative law, and public finance; as well as to development practitioners and policy-makers in developing countries, donor governments and international institutions.

Carlos Santiso is Manager of the Governance Division of the African Development Bank

More from this author