Political Power and Corporate Control

Regular price €40.99
A01=James Shinn
A01=Peter A. Gourevitch
Activist shareholder
Author_James Shinn
Author_Peter A. Gourevitch
Bureaucrat
Business manager
Business sector
Business valuation
Capital budgeting
Capital control
Capital market
Capital structure
Capitalism
Category=JP
Category=KJV
Cohabitation (government)
Competition (economics)
Competition law
Corporate behaviour
Corporate finance
Corporate governance
Corporate group
Corporate headquarters
Corporate law
Corporate social responsibility
Corporate structure
Corporation
Corporatism
Crony capitalism
Economic forces
Economic ideology
Economic interventionism
Economic planning
Economic policy
Economic power
Economic restructuring
Employment
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Equity Market
Executive compensation
Financial analysis
Financial intermediary
Fiscal policy
Global financial system
Global governance
Governance
Institutional investor
Interest of the company
Investment banking
Investment company
Investor
Investor relations
Labour power
Pension fund
Political economy
Political entrepreneur
Politics
Politique
Public expenditure
Robber baron (industrialist)
Shareholder
Shareholder primacy
Shareholder value
Stakeholder (corporate)
State-owned enterprise
Tax
Tax avoidance
Tax collector
Tax policy
Tax reform
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
The Nature of the Firm
The Oligarchs
Theory of the firm
Varieties of Capitalism
Wealth management

Product details

  • ISBN 9780691133812
  • Weight: 539g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
  • Publication Date: 05 Aug 2007
  • Publisher: Princeton University Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Paperback
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Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.
Peter A. Gourevitch is Professor of Political Science and founding Dean at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. He is the author of "Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises" and former coeditor of "International Organization". James Shinn Visiting Professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, where he teaches courses on technology and foreign policy. Previously he worked in the U.S. State Department's East Asia Bureau and was later a general manager, entrepreneur, and outside director for fifteen years in the high tech industry at various firms including Dialogic, which he cofounded.