Politics of Bad Governance in Contemporary Russia

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agency
authoritarianism
bad governance
Category=JP
Category=KCL
Category=KCP
corruption
elites
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
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eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
government
ineffectiveness of government
modernization
pockets of efficiency
policy entrepreneurship
policy-making
political leadership
politics
post-Communism
predatory state
rent-seeking
rule of law
Russia
socio-economic development
state regulations
state-building
technocracy

Product details

  • ISBN 9780472075621
  • Weight: 363g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 15 Nov 2022
  • Publisher: The University of Michigan Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Hardback
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In this book, Vladimir Gel’man considers bad governance as a distinctive politico-economic order that is based on a set of formal and informal rules, norms, and practices quite different from those of good governance. Some countries are governed badly intentionally because the political leaders of these countries establish and maintain rules, norms, and practices that serve their own self-interests. Gel’man considers bad governance as a primarily agency-driven rather than structure-induced phenomenon. He addresses the issue of causes and mechanisms of bad governance in Russia and beyond from a different scholarly optics, which is based on a more general rationale of state-building, political regime dynamics, and policy-making. He argues that although these days, bad governance is almost universally perceived as an anomaly, at least in developed countries, in fact human history is largely a history of ineffective and corrupt governments, while the rule of law and decent state regulatory quality are relatively recent matters of modern history, when they emerged as side effects of state-building. Indeed, the picture is quite the opposite: bad governance is the norm, while good governance is an exception. The problem is that most rulers, especially if their time horizons are short and the external constraints on their behavior are not especially binding, tend to govern their domains in a predatory way because of the prevalence of short-term over long-term incentives. Contemporary Russia may be considered as a prime example of this phenomenon. Using an analysis of case studies of political and policy changes in Russia after the Soviet collapse, Gel’man discusses the logic of building and maintaining the politico-economic order of bad governance in Russia and paths of its possible transformation in a theoretical and comparative perspective.

Vladimir Gel’man is Professor at the European University at St. Petersburg and University of Helsinki.