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Politics of Delegation
Politics of Delegation
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agencies
Agency Rule Making
alec
Alec Stone Sweet
Category=JPA
Central Bank Independence
Clear Error
Comparative European Politics
comparative public administration
Competition Agencies
Constitutional Judges
Delegating Statute
empirical study of institutional delegation
Enforce EU Law
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
EU Legislator
EU's Constitutive Treaty
EU's Supranational Institution
European governance structures
Federal Cartel Office
General Competition Authorities
German Federal Cartel Office
German Government
independent
Independent Central Banks
institutions
judicial independence
Legislative Principals
mark
Ministerial Oversight
non-majoritarian
Non-majoritarian Institutions
policy delegation analysis
Principal Agent Analysis
principal agent theory
Rational Institutionalist Perspective
regulatory
regulatory autonomy research
Significant Agency Costs
stone
Supranational Institutions
sweet
thatcher
Product details
- ISBN 9780714684437
- Weight: 460g
- Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
- Publication Date: 01 Apr 2004
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
There is a growing interest in delegation to non-majoritarian institutions in Europe, following both the spread of principal-agent theory in political science and law and increasing delegation in practice. During the 1980s and 1990s, governments and parliaments in West European nations have delegated powers and functions to non-majoritarian bodies - the EU, independent central banks, constitutional courts and independent regulatory agencies. Whereas elected policymakers had been increasing their roles over several decades, delegation involves a remarkable reversal or at least transformation of their position. This volume examines key issues about the politics of delegation: how and why delegation has taken place; the institutional design of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the consequences of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the legitimacy of non-majoritarian institutions. The book addresses these questions both theoretically and empirically, looking at central areas of political life - central banking, the EU, the increasing role of courts and the establishment and impacts of independent regulatory agencies.
Mark Thatcher, Alec Stone Sweet
Politics of Delegation
€61.50
