Populist Paradox
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A01=Elisabeth R. Gerber
Absentee ballot
Activism
Advocacy group
Affirmative action
Author_Elisabeth R. Gerber
Ballot
Ballot access
Ballot box
Ballot measure
Buckley v. Valeo
Bureaucrat
Calculation
Campaign finance
Campaign finance reform in the United States
Category=JPA
Category=JPHF
Category=JPV
Category=JPWG
Citizens (Spanish political party)
Committee
Comparative advantage
Constitutional amendment
Corporate tax
Corporatocracy
Deliberation
Direct democracy
Dummy variable (statistics)
Economics
Employment
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Federal Election Campaign Act
Fraud
Freedom of speech
Funding
Fundraising
Good government
Great power
Immigration reform
Inference
Legislation
Legislator
Legislature
Lobbying
Minor party
National initiative
New Laws
Opportunity cost
Original intent
Participation bias
Political agenda
Political campaign
Political science
Political strategy
Popular referendum
Populism
Progressivism in the United States
Rates (tax)
Recall election
Red tape
Referendum
Response bias
Risk aversion
Safe seat
Statistical significance
Supermajority
Tax
Tax incidence
Tax policy
Tax reform
Telephone interview
Term limit
The Political Process
Voter fatigue
Voter registration
Voting
Voting behavior
Product details
- ISBN 9780691002675
- Weight: 28g
- Dimensions: 197 x 254mm
- Publication Date: 21 Jul 1999
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however, challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation, she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big influence. Gerber bases her findings on extensive surveys of the activities and motivations of interest groups and on close examination of campaign finance records from 168 direct legislation campaigns in eight states. Her research confirms what such wealthy interests as the insurance industry, trial lawyer associations, and tobacco companies have learned by defeats at the ballot box: if citizens do not like a proposed new law, even an expensive, high-profile campaign will not make them change their mind.
She demonstrates, however, that these economic interest groups have considerable success in using direct legislation to block initiatives that others are proposing and to exert pressure on politicians. By contrast, citizen interest groups with broad-based support and significant organizational resources have proven to be extremely effective in using direct legislation to pass new laws. Clearly written and argued, this is a major theoretical and empirical contribution to our understanding of the role of citizens and organized interests in the American legislative process.
Elisabeth R. Gerber, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, studies the consequences of U.S. election laws on interest representation. She is currently working on a major study of primary election laws in the American states.
