Praise and Blame
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€84.99
A01=Daniel N. Robinson
Akrasia
Alfred Mele
Analogy
Aristotle
Attempt
Author_Daniel N. Robinson
Axiology
Book
Calculation
Category=JMA
Category=QDTQ
Causality
Certainty
Compatibilism
Concept
Consciousness
Consequentialism
Consideration
Contingency (philosophy)
Credulity
Criticism
Critique
Critique of Pure Reason
Deliberation
Delusion
Determinism
Disadvantage
Disposition
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eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Ethics
Explanation
Fatalism
First principle
Forgiveness
Form of life (philosophy)
Galen Strawson
Hard determinism
Inquiry
Lecture
Moral luck
Moral realism
Moral relativism
Moral responsibility
Morality
Narrative
Natural kind
Objectivity (philosophy)
Oxford University Press
Personal identity
Phenomenon
Philosopher
Philosophy
Presumption (canon law)
Principle
Psychoanalysis
Punishment
Rationality
Reality
Reason
Remorse
Requirement
Resentment
Result
Rhetoric
Richard Swinburne
Roger Crisp
Self-deception
State of nature
Stoicism
Theory
Thomas Nagel
Thought
Treatise
Utilitarianism
Product details
- ISBN 9780691057248
- Weight: 482g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 29 Jul 2002
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
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How should a prize be awarded after a horse race? Should it go to the best rider, the best person, or the one who finishes first? To what extent are bystanders blameworthy when they do nothing to prevent harm? Are there any objective standards of moral responsibility with which to address such perennial questions? In this fluidly written and lively book, Daniel Robinson takes on the prodigious task of setting forth the contours of praise and blame. He does so by mounting an important and provocative new defense of a radical theory of moral realism and offering a critical appraisal of prevailing alternatives such as determinism and behaviorism and of their conceptual shortcomings. The version of moral realism that arises from Robinson's penetrating inquiry--an inquiry steeped in Aristotelian ethics but deeply informed by modern scientific knowledge of human cognition--is independent of cognition and emotion. At the same time, Robinson carefully explores how such human attributes succeed or fail in comprehending real moral properties.
Through brilliant analyses of constitutional and moral luck, of biosocial and genetic versions of psychological determinism, and of relativistic-anthropological accounts of variations in moral precepts, he concludes that none of these conceptions accounts either for the nature of moral properties or the basis upon which they could be known. Ultimately, the theory that Robinson develops preserves moral properties even while acknowledging the conditions that undermine the powers of human will.
Daniel N. Robinson is Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus, Georgetown University. He is Faculty Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University where he has lectured annually since 1991. He is the author or editor of numerous books including "Wild Beasts and Idle Humors: The Insanity Defense from Antiquity to the Present" and "Aristotle's Psychology".
