Preference and Information
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€192.20
A01=Dan Egonsson
accounts
agent-neutral value
Author_Dan Egonsson
Category=QD
Category=QDTK
Category=QDTQ
Chronic
Classical Cd
Cognitive Psychotherapy
Contemplative Preference
epistemic requirements
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Euthanasia Case
extensional
Extensional Understanding
Follow
full
Full Information Account
Good Life
hypothetical scenarios
Information Requirement
informed preferences
Instrumental Preference
Intentional Understanding
intrinsic
Intrinsic Preferences
Maximally Vivid
Passive Euthanasia
Preference Rationality
preference satisfaction in moral philosophy
preferences
Punk Music
Pure Time Discounting
rabinowicz
rational
rational choice ethics
Relevant Factual Information
Reluctant Philosopher
requirement
Tragic Philosopher
True Relevant Beliefs
Unconditional Preference
understanding
Vivid Manner
well-being theory
wlodek
Wlodek Rabinowicz
Product details
- ISBN 9780754657255
- Weight: 453g
- Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
- Publication Date: 28 Mar 2007
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
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Is it important to our quality of life that the preferences we satisfy are rational and well-informed? Standard preferentialist theories allege that a person's preferences and their satisfaction are the correct measure of well-being. In preference-sensitive theories, preferences are important but do not count for everything. This raises the question of whether we ought to make demands on these preferences. In this book Egonsson presents a critical analysis of the 'Full Information Account of the Good', which claims that only the satisfaction of rational and fully informed preferences has value for a person. The problems he deals with include: how is an information requirement to be formulated and shaped? Is it possible to design a requirement that is both neutral to the agent's epistemic situation and reasonable? Is the requirement reasonable? Does it make sense to claim that some are better off if we satisfy the preferences they would have had in some merely hypothetical circumstances? This is an important new book on preference rationality which will be of great interest to academics and students of ethics, quality of life, and rationality.
Dan Egonsson is Reader in the Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Sweden.
