Presidential Power in Latin America

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A01=Dan Berbecel
Argentina
Argentine Presidents
Author_Dan Berbecel
Authoritarianism
Bust Boom Cycle
Category=JKSW1
Category=JPQ
Chile
Chilean Presidents
comparative government studies
Comparative Politics
Constitutional Presidential Powers
Constitutional Tribunal
CPI Score
DDP
Democracy
Democratic Backsliding
Electoral Systems
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
executive authority analysis
Executive Politics
Federal Deputy
Formal Presidential Power
Gdp Growth
Gdp Growth Rate
Horizontal Accountability
Hyperpresidentialism
hyperpresidentialism causes
informal executive power in Argentina and Chile
informal political power
Institutional Strength
Judicial Constraints
Latin American Politics
Legislative Constraints
legislative party dynamics
Line Item Veto
Open List Electoral System
Open List System
Partisan Power
Peronist Party
Peronist Presidents
Post-democratization Period
Presidency
Presidential Politics
Presidential Power
Regime Politics
state institutional strength
Supreme Court

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367696917
  • Weight: 460g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 25 Sep 2023
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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What explains variance in presidential power between countries? In Presidential Power in Latin America, Dan Berbecel provides a general, systematic theory for explaining presidential power in practice as opposed to presidential power in theory.

Using expert survey data from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) alongside interviews with high-level figures in politics, the judiciary, the public administration, NGOs, and academia in Argentina and Chile, Berbecel argues that constitutional presidential power (formal power) is a very poor predictor of presidential power in practice (informal power). Given the poor predictive value of formal rules, he provides an explanation why hyperpresidentialism emerges in some countries but not in others. Berbecel attributes the root causes of hyperpresidentialism to three independent variables (the strength of state institutions, the size of the president’s party in congress, and whether or not the country has a history of economic crises) which together determine how likely it is that a president will be able to concentrate power.

Presidential Power in Latin America will be of key interest to scholars and students of executive politics, Latin American politics, and more broadly, comparative politics.

Dan Berbecel is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at York University (the Glendon Campus) in Toronto, Canada. His main area of research interest is Comparative Politics, with a focus on Latin American Politics.

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