Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Distribution in Federal Democracies

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A01=Lucas I. Gonzalez
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Author_Lucas I. Gonzalez
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Category=JPHL
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Central Government
Comparative Historical Analysis
comparative politics
Decentralization
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eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Federal Balance
Federalism
Fiscal Context
fiscal decentralisation
Fiscal Pact
Fiscal Transfers
Fiscal Urgency
Game Theoretical Framework
Governors Faced
Hard Budget Constraints
intergovernmental relations
Junta
Latin America
Latin American Federations
Military Junta
Normal Form Game
Partisan Powers
political economy Latin America
Political Elites
Public Policy
public policy analysis
resource allocation in federal systems
Selective Incentives
Status Quo Ante
Strong Fiscal Incentives
Sub-national Governments
Sub-national Units
subnational governance
Subnational Governments
Subnational Leaders
Subnational Units
Va Ri

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138487345
  • Weight: 630g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 05 Feb 2018
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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Tensions between central authorities and subnational units over centralization and fiscal autonomy are on top of the political agenda in many developing federal countries.

This book examines historical changes in the balance between the resources that presidents and governors control and the policy responsibilities they have to deliver. It focuses on Argentina and Brazil, the most decentralized federal countries in Latin America, with the most powerful sub-national governments in the region. Using formal modelling, statistical tools, and comparative historical analyses, it examines substantive shifts in the allocation of resources and the distribution of administrative functions and explains under which conditions these changes occur. In doing so, it presents theoretical and comparative implications for the study of fiscal federalism and the functioning of developing federal democracies.

This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of federalism, intergovernmental relations, decentralization, and sub-national politics and more broadly to those studying comparative politics, democratization, political elites, public policy and economics.

Lucas Gonzalez is Researcher at the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET) and the Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA), and full-time Professor at the Universidad Nacional de San Martín (UNSAM) in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

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