A01=Joshua Gert
Author_Joshua Gert
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=JMR
Category=NL-HP
Category=NL-JM
Category=QDTJ
Category=QDTM
COP=United Kingdom
Discount=15
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eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Format=BB
Format_Hardback
HMM=240
IMPN=Oxford University Press
ISBN13=9780198785910
Language_English
PA=Available
PD=20170720
POP=Oxford
Price_€50 to €100
PS=Active
PUB=Oxford University Press
SMM=21
Subject=Philosophy
Subject=Psychology
WG=538
WMM=161
Product details
- ISBN 9780198785910
- Format: Hardback
- Weight: 538g
- Dimensions: 161 x 240 x 21mm
- Publication Date: 06 Jul 2017
- Publisher: Oxford University Press
- Publication City/Country: Oxford, GB
- Product Form: Hardback
- Language: English
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Joshua Gert presents an original account of color properties, and of our perception of them. He employs a general philosophical strategy - neo-pragmatism - which challenges an assumption made by virtually all other theories of color. Neo-pragmatism rejects the standard representationalist strategy for solving "placement problems" in philosophy, which relies on the existence of a substantive notion of reference and truth. Instead, it makes use of deflationary accounts of such semantic notions. Applied to the domain of color, the result is a view according to which colors are primitive properties of objects, irreducible to physical or dispositional properties. In this way they are more like numbers, and less like natural kinds such as water or gold. Objective colors are also - contrary to current dogma - insufficiently determinate in their nature to allow them to be associated with precise points in standard color spaces. A given color can present different veridical appearances in different viewing circumstances, and to different normal viewers. It is these appearances, which are to be understood in an adverbial way, that can be located in standard color spaces. In explaining the distinction between objective color and color appearance, a central analogy to which Gert appeals is that between the perceptible three-dimensional shape of an object, and the various ways in which that shape appears from various perspectives. Primitive Colors also offers an account of color constancy, a moderated version of representationalism about visual experience, and a criticism of the thesis of the transparency of experience.
Joshua Gert is the Francis S. Haserot Professor of Philosophy at The College of William and Mary. In addition to his work on color, he is also the author of Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action (2004) and Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality and Reasons (2012), both of which develop a particular account of rational action and normative practical reasons.
