Privileging Industry
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A01=Fiona McGillivray
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Author_Fiona McGillivray
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Centre-right politics
Coalition government
Common front
Comparative advantage
Compromise agreement
Corporation
Cutlery
Developed country
Economic interventionism
Economic rent
Economic stagnation
Economics
Efficient-market hypothesis
Electoral district
Employment
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eq_business-finance-law
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eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Expense
Export restriction
Financial Times
Free trade
Generalized System of Preferences
Import quota
Income
Industrial policy
Industry Group
Inflation
Institutional investor
Investor
Jurisdiction
Layoff
Leads and lags
Legislation
Legislator
Legislature
Liberalization
Major party
Marginal seat
Market Indicators
Microeconomic reform
Minority government
Multi-party system
Nationalization
Nontariff Barrier
Party discipline
Party system
Political party
Prediction
Price Change
Price controls
Proportional representation
Recession
Regional policy
Right-wing politics
Safe seat
Section 201
Single-member district
Social democracy
Stock market
Subsidy
Supermajority
Tariff
Tax
Trade preference
Trade war
Unemployment
Vote trading
Voting
World Trade Organization
Write-off
Product details
- ISBN 9780691027708
- Weight: 312g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 14 Mar 2004
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Why do some industries win substantial protection from the whims of international trade while others do not? Privileging Industry challenges standard approaches to this question in its examination of when governments use trade and industrial policy for political goals. Fiona McGillivray shows why aiding an industry can be a politically efficient way for a government to redistribute resources from one industrial sector to another. Taking a comparative perspective that stands in contrast with the usual focus on U.S. trade politics, she explores, for example, how electoral rules, party strength, and industrial geography affect redistribution politics across countries. How do political institutions and the geographical dispersion of industries interact to determine which industries governments privilege? What tests can assess how governments distribute assistance across industries? Research has focused on the industries that legislators want to protect, but just as important is identifying those legislators able to deliver trade assistance. Assisting an industry requires both a will and a means.
Whether an industry is a good vehicle through which to redistribute income depends on its geographic make-up and the country's electoral system. In turn, the electoral system and party strength affect how legislators' preferences contribute to policy. McGillivray tests these arguments using a tariff-based empirical test and nonstandard dependent variables such as the dispersion of stock prices within fourteen different capital markets, and government influence in the targeting of plant closures within declining industries.
Fiona McGillivray is Assistant Professor of Politics at New York University.
