Above Ground
Agnostic
Bird 2007a
brian
categorical
Categorical Property
Category=PBB
Category=PDA
Category=QDTJ
causal
Causal Powers
causal powers theory
Counterfactual Dependence
Determinable Kinds
disposition
dispositional
dispositional essentialism
Dispositional Monism
Dispositional Properties
Distinct Ontological Category
Electrical Synapses
ellis
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_science
essence
Existential Entailment
fundamental
Fundamental Defining Characteristic
Infimic Species
Kind Iron
mathematical realism debate
metaphysical analysis in science
Metaphysical Essences
Multi-track Dispositions
Natural Kinds
natural kinds classification
Nomic Necessitation
Ontological Dependence
philosophy of science research
Physical Causal Process
property
pure
Pure Dispositions
Scientific Kinds
scientific ontology
Truthmaker Theory
Product details
- ISBN 9780415895354
- Weight: 680g
- Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
- Publication Date: 21 Dec 2011
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
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While the phrase "metaphysics of science" has been used from time to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science—and the sciences themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics of science is an innovative field of research in its own right. The principle areas covered are:
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- The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties essentially categorical? Are they all essentially dispositions, or are some categorical and others dispositional?
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- Realism in mathematics and its relation to science: What does a naturalistic commitment of scientific realism tell us about our commitments to mathematical entities? Can this question be framed in something other than a Quinean philosophy?
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- Dispositions and their relation to causation: Can we generate an account of causation that takes dispositionality as fundamental? And if we take dispositions as fundamental (and hence not having a categorical causal basis), what is the ontological ground of dispositions?
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- Pandispositionalism: Could all properties be dispositional in nature?
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- Natural kinds: Are there natural kinds, and if so what account of their nature should we give? For example, do they have essences? Here we consider how these issues may be illuminated by considering examples from reals science, in particular biochemistry and neurobiology.
Alexander Bird is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol.
Brian Ellis is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at La Trobe University and Professorial Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Melbourne.
Howard Sankey is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne.
