A01=Ken Binmore
Age Group_Uncategorized
Age Group_Uncategorized
Alice and Bob
Almost surely
Ambiguity
Author_Ken Binmore
automatic-update
Axiom
Axiom of choice
Base rate fallacy
Bayes' rule
Bayes' theorem
Bayesian
Bayesian inference
Bayesian probability
Bruno de Finetti
Calculation
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=GPQ
Category=KCA
Category=KJMD
Category=PBUD
Choice function
Common knowledge (logic)
Conditional probability
Contradiction
COP=United States
Decision problem
Decision theory
Decision-making
Delivery_Delivery within 10-20 working days
Diagram (category theory)
Economics
Economist
Ellsberg paradox
Epistemology
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Expected utility hypothesis
Expected value
Explanation
Foundations of statistics
Idealization
Indifference curve
Inductive reasoning
Language_English
Lebesgue measure
Linearity
Matching Pennies
Mathematics
Measure (mathematics)
Nash equilibrium
Natural number
Objective Probability
PA=Available
Philosopher
Posterior probability
Prediction
Preference (economics)
Preference relation
Price_€20 to €50
Principle
Prior probability
Prisoner's dilemma
Probability
Probability measure
Probability theory
PS=Active
Rational agent
Rational choice theory
Rationality
Real number
Reason
Requirement
Result
Risk aversion
softlaunch
State of the World (book series)
Strategy (game theory)
Subset
Suggestion
Superadditivity
Theory
Uncertainty
Upper and lower probabilities
Utilitarianism
Utility
Veil of ignorance
Product details
- ISBN 9780691149899
- Weight: 28g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 14 Mar 2011
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
- Language: English
Secure
checkout
Fast Shipping
Easy returns
It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use Bayesian decision theory--and when does it need to be modified? Using a minimum of mathematics, Rational Decisions clearly explains the foundations of Bayesian decision theory and shows why Savage restricted the theory's application to small worlds. The book is a wide-ranging exploration of standard theories of choice and belief under risk and uncertainty. Ken Binmore discusses the various philosophical attitudes related to the nature of probability and offers resolutions to paradoxes believed to hinder further progress.
In arguing that the Bayesian approach to knowledge is inadequate in a large world, Binmore proposes an extension to Bayesian decision theory--allowing the idea of a mixed strategy in game theory to be expanded to a larger set of what Binmore refers to as "muddled" strategies. Written by one of the world's leading game theorists, Rational Decisions is the touchstone for anyone needing a concise, accessible, and expert view on Bayesian decision making.
Ken Binmore is a mathematician turned economist and philosopher. He has held chairs at the London School of Economics and Political Science as well as other universities, and is professor emeritus of economics at University College London. His recent books include "Natural Justice, Does Game Theory Work?", and "A Very Short Introduction to Game Theory".
