Home
»
Rational Ritual
A01=Michael Suk-Young Chwe
Advertising
Advertising campaign
Advocacy group
Age Group_Uncategorized
Age Group_Uncategorized
American University in Cairo Press
Apple Inc.
Attendance
Author_Michael Suk-Young Chwe
automatic-update
Barry R. Weingast
Blind carbon copy
Cable television
Cambridge University Press
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=JBCC
Category=JFC
Columbia Pictures
Common knowledge
Common knowledge (logic)
Comparative politics
COP=United States
Crowd psychology
Cultural practice
Customer
Delivery_Delivery within 10-20 working days
Disadvantage
Domestic violence
Elsevier
Email
Employment
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Explanation
Eye contact
Free rider problem
Global Community
Halitosis
Handbook
Household
Human behavior
Ideology
Institution
Jeremy Bentham
Language_English
Listerine
Macintosh
Marketing
Mass marketing
Metaknowledge
New York University
Newspaper
Oxford University Press
PA=Available
Person
Philosophy
Pluralistic ignorance
Political communication
Political science
Precedent
Prediction
Price_€20 to €50
Probability
PS=Active
Public sphere
Publicity
Rational choice theory
Rationality
Reason
Sharia
Social integration
Social Practice
Sociology
softlaunch
State of the World (book series)
Subculture
Suggestion
Surveillance
Television
Television network
The Other Hand
Theory
Theory of mind
Thomas Schelling
Workhouse
World history
Product details
- ISBN 9780691158280
- Weight: 198g
- Dimensions: 140 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 28 Apr 2013
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
- Language: English
Delivery/Collection within 10-20 working days
Our Delivery Time Frames Explained
2-4 Working Days: Available in-stock
10-20 Working Days: On Backorder
Will Deliver When Available: On Pre-Order or Reprinting
We ship your order once all items have arrived at our warehouse and are processed. Need those 2-4 day shipping items sooner? Just place a separate order for them!
Why do Internet, financial service, and beer commercials dominate Super Bowl advertising? How do political ceremonies establish authority? Why does repetition characterize anthems and ritual speech? Why were circular forms favored for public festivals during the French Revolution? This book answers these questions using a single concept: common knowledge. Game theory shows that in order to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form "common knowledge." Each person wants to participate only if others also participate. Members must have knowledge of each other, knowledge of that knowledge, knowledge of the knowledge of that knowledge, and so on. Michael Chwe applies this insight, with striking erudition, to analyze a range of rituals across history and cultures. He shows that public ceremonies are powerful not simply because they transmit meaning from a central source to each audience member but because they let audience members know what other members know. For instance, people watching the Super Bowl know that many others are seeing precisely what they see and that those people know in turn that many others are also watching.
This creates common knowledge, and advertisers selling products that depend on consensus are willing to pay large sums to gain access to it. Remarkably, a great variety of rituals and ceremonies, such as formal inaugurations, work in much the same way. By using a rational-choice argument to explain diverse cultural practices, Chwe argues for a close reciprocal relationship between the perspectives of rationality and culture. He illustrates how game theory can be applied to an unexpectedly broad spectrum of problems, while showing in an admirably clear way what game theory might hold for scholars in the social sciences and humanities who are not yet acquainted with it. In a new afterword, Chwe delves into new applications of common knowledge, both in the real world and in experiments, and considers how generating common knowledge has become easier in the digital age.
Michael Suk-Young Chwe is Associate Professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles and author of Jane Austen, Game Theorist (Princeton).
Qty:
