Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951
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A01=Alan S. Milward
American Recession
Author_Alan S. Milward
Category=KCZ
Category=NH
Category=NHD
Customs Union Study Group
EPU
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
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eq_non-fiction
European Customs Union
German Government
German Steel Industry
International Ruhr Authority
intra-Western European Trade
Marshall Aid
Monnet Plan
Multilateral Payments System
OEEC Council
Planning Commissariat
Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter
Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter
Ruhr Authority
Schuman Proposals
Sterling Area
Stikker Plan
UK Delegation
United States
West Germany
Western Europe's Foreign Trade
Western Europe's Reconstruction
Western European Customs Union
Product details
- ISBN 9780415612876
- Weight: 1040g
- Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
- Publication Date: 23 Jul 2012
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
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First Published in 2005. The remarkable success and duration of the economic and political reconstruction of Western Europe after the Second World War have exercised a generation of historians. Few could have predicted, in 1945, that the shattered nations of Western Europe were on the brink of one of the most prosperous and creditable periods of their history; but the explanations given for the significance of individual nation-states’ success have been contradictory. In this comprehensive survey Professor Milward has drawn on newly-released archival sources from six countries, and material from eleven more, to provide an analysis of the European reconstruction and the origins of the Great Boom. He argues that success came about partly because Western Europe created its own pattern of institutionalized, economic interdependence which allowed the separate domestic plans of individual countries to flourish; and he is also able to analyse the relationship of the greater and lesser states in this new pattern. The new archival evidence provided in the book overturns widely-held views about the nature and effects of individual aspects of the settlements, such as Marshall Aid, the OEEC, the European Payments Union, the SchuMan Plan and Bretton Woods. The role of the Marshall Plan, for example, is challenged in a sustained comparison between the professed objectives of policy and the underlying realities of both policy and economic results, which has fundamental implications for our diplomatic, economic and political understanding of the period. Professor Milward’s text is refreshingly clear and fully documented with tables, annotated footnotes and bibliography. It is the first comprehensive study of a subject which is the focus of much academic research, and a major work of scholarship which sets new standards for the interpretation of the immediate post-war years.
