Regulation versus Litigation
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Product details
- ISBN 9780226432205
- Weight: 539g
- Dimensions: 16 x 23mm
- Publication Date: 22 Jun 2012
- Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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The efficacy of various political institutions is the subject of intense debate between proponents of broad legislative standards enforced through litigation and those who prefer regulation by administrative agencies. This book explores the trade-offs between litigation and regulation, the circumstances in which one approach may outperform the other, and the principles that affect the choice between addressing particular economic activities with one system or the other. Combining theoretical analysis with empirical investigation in a range of industries, including public health, financial markets, medical care, and workplace safety, "Regulation versus Litigation" sheds light on the costs and benefits of two important instruments of economic policy.
Daniel P. Kessler is a professor at the Law School and Graduate School of Business, Stanford University; a senior fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution; and a research associate of the NBER.
