A Tract of Time
A01=Charles Lipson
Anti-communism
Appeasement
Arbitration
Arms control
Audience cost
Author_Charles Lipson
Balance of terror
Bandwagoning
Category=JPHV
Clash of Civilizations
Cold War
Containment
Democracy
Democracy promotion
Democratic liberalism
Democratic peace theory
Dictatorship
Distrust
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Foreign policy
Freedom of speech
Great power
Hegemonic stability theory
High politics
Imperialism
Insurgency
International crisis
International relations
International Trade Organization
James Fearon
Japan-United States relations
Jimmy Carter
John Mearsheimer
John Mueller
Liberal democracy
Liberalism
Militarized interstate dispute
Military alliance
Military dictatorship
Military occupation
Military threat
National security
Opportunism
Peaceful coexistence
Political censorship
Popular sovereignty
Power politics
Preemptive war
Protectionism
Ratification
Reactionary
Realpolitik
Relative gain (international relations)
Right-wing politics
Rogue state
Security community
Security dilemma
Security studies
Soviet Empire
Soviet Union
State of nature
Strongman (politics)
The Great Game
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
Theory of International Politics
Total war
Treaty
Veto
War
War of aggression
Warfare
World War II
Product details
- ISBN 9780691122779
- Weight: 425g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 13 Feb 2005
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Democracies often go to war but almost never against each other. Indeed, "the democratic peace" has become a catchphrase among scholars and even U.S. Presidents. But why do democracies avoid fighting each other? Reliable Partners offers the first systematic and definitive explanation. Examining decades of research and speculation on the subject and testing this against the history of relations between democracies over the last two centuries, Charles Lipson concludes that constitutional democracies have a "contracting advantage"--a unique ability to settle conflicts with each other by durable agreements. In so doing he forcefully counters realist claims that a regime's character is irrelevant to war and peace. Lipson argues that because democracies are confident their bargains will stick, they can negotiate effective settlements with each other rather than incur the great costs of war. Why are democracies more reliable partners? Because their politics are uniquely open to outside scrutiny and facilitate long-term commitments. They cannot easily bluff, deceive, or launch surprise attacks.
While this transparency weakens their bargaining position, it also makes their promises more credible--and more durable, for democracies are generally stable. Their leaders are constrained by constitutional rules, independent officials, and the political costs of abandoning public commitments. All this allows for solid bargains between democracies. When democracies contemplate breaking their agreements, their open debate gives partners advance notice and a chance to protect themselves. Hence agreements among democracies are less risky than those with nondemocratic states. Setting rigorous analysis in friendly, vigorous prose, Reliable Partners resolves longstanding questions about the democratic peace and highlights important new findings about democracies in world politics, from rivalries to alliances. Above all, it shows conclusively that democracies are uniquely adapted to seal enduring bargains with each other and thus avoid the blight of war.
Charles Lipson is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he founded and codirects PIPES, the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security. He is the author of "Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries".
