Rights and Reason

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A01=Jonathan Gorman
Apparent Oddity
Author_Jonathan Gorman
Cambridge
Cambridge University
Category=QDTQ
Category=QDTS
Common Carrier
epistemology of rights
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eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Grotius
Hare's Distinction
Hare’s Distinction
Hohfeld's Analysis
Hohfeld's Scheme
Hohfeld's System
Hohfeld's Theory
Hohfeld’s Analysis
Hohfeld’s Scheme
Hohfeld’s System
Hugo Grotius
John Lockes
Jural Correlatives
Jural Opposites
justice pluralism
Kant's Moral Philosophy
Kant’s Moral Philosophy
legal theory
moral reasoning
Natural Duties
Natural Standard
normative ethics
Person's Legal Rights
political philosophy
pragmatic conflict resolution in law
Rational Persuasiveness
Rational Self-mastery
Rawls's Understanding
Rawls’s Understanding
Samuel Von Pufendorf
Standard Empiricist Model
Unchanging Human Nature
Vice Versa

Product details

  • ISBN 9781902683737
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
  • Publication Date: 30 Aug 2003
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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In "Rights and Reason", Jonathan Gorman sets discussion of the 'rights debate' within a wide-ranging philosophical and historical framework. Drawing on positions in epistemology, metaphysics and the theory of human nature as well as on the ideas of canonical thinkers, Gorman provides an introduction to the philosophy of rights that is firmly grounded in the history of philosophy as well as the concerns of contemporary political and legal philosophy. The book gives readers a clear sense that, just as there are arguments about the content of rights, and just as there are myriad claims to rights, so there are pluralities of theories of rights that offer some understanding of the moral and legal realm and of the place rights may hold within it. Gorman argues that in a pluralist context of inconsistent rights we require pragmatic procedures rather than universal principles of justice to resolve conflicting claims.
Jonathan Gorman is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the Queen's University of Belfast.

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