Rise of the Agricultural Welfare State
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A01=Adam D. Sheingate
Activism
Advocacy group
Agricultural Adjustment Administration
Agricultural cooperative
Agricultural extension
Agricultural policy
Agricultural subsidy
Agriculture
Agriculture (Chinese mythology)
American Farm Bureau Federation
Author_Adam D. Sheingate
Budget process
Bureaucrat
Category=JPA
Category=JPWG
Category=KNAC
Commodity
Commodity market
Common Agricultural Policy
Corporatism
Cost-benefit analysis
Decentralization
Direct Payments
Economic interventionism
Economic policy
Economics
Economist
Employment
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Farm crisis
Farm income
Farmer
Farmers' Alliance
Fertilizer
Government
Institution
Jacob Hacker
Jurisdiction
Legislation
Lobbying
Martin Shefter
Obstacle
Party system
Payment
Policy
Policy analysis
Political alliance
Political economy
Political machine
Political organization
Political party
Political science
Politician
Politics
Price support
Production control
Public policy
Regulation
Regulatory capture
State-owned enterprise
Subsidy
Supply (economics)
Tariff
Tax
Taxpayer
Technology
The Origins of the Urban Crisis
Theda Skocpol
United States Department of Agriculture
United States Secretary of Agriculture
Victorian America
Voting
Welfare
Welfare state
World War II
Product details
- ISBN 9780691116280
- Weight: 454g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 22 Jul 2003
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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A long-dominant reading of American politics holds that public policy in the United States is easily captured by special interest groups. Countering this view, Adam Sheingate traces the development of government intervention in agriculture from its nineteenth-century origins to contemporary struggles over farm subsidies. His considered conclusion is that American institutions have not given agricultural interest groups any particular advantages in the policy process, in part because opposing lobbies also enjoy access to policymakers. In fact, the high degree of conflict and pluralism maintained by American institutions made possible substantial retrenchment of the agricultural welfare state during the 1980s and 1990s. In Japan and France--two countries with markedly different institutional characters than the United States--powerful agricultural interests and a historically close relationship between farmers, bureaucrats, and politicians continue to preclude a roll-back of farm subsidies.
This well-crafted study not only puts a new spin on agricultural policy, but also makes a strong case for the broader claim that the relatively decentralized American political system is actually less prone to capture and rule by subgovernments than the more centralized political systems found in France and Japan. Sheingate's historical, comparative approach also demonstrates, in a widely useful way, how past institutional developments shape current policies and options.
Adam D. Sheingate is Assistant Professor of Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University.
