Robust Mechanism Design: The Role Of Private Information And Higher Order Beliefs
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A01=Dirk Bergemann
A01=Stephen Morris
Auction Theory
Author_Dirk Bergemann
Author_Stephen Morris
BayesNash Equilibrium
Belief-Free Mechanisms
Category=KCA
Common Value
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Ex Post Equilibrium
First and Higher-Order Belief
Game Theory
Implementation
Interdependent Value
Mechanism Design
Private Information
Private Value
Rationalizability
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
Product details
- ISBN 9789814374583
- Publication Date: 23 Mar 2012
- Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd
- Publication City/Country: SG
- Product Form: Hardback
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Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
