A01=Barbara Reardon Farnham
Adolf Hitler
Adviser
Appeasement
Author_Barbara Reardon Farnham
Belligerent
Bernard Baruch
Blockade
Calculation
Category=JPQB
Category=JPSD
Category=NHD
Category=NHK
Category=NHWL
Category=NHWR7
Collective security
Containment
Criticism
Czechoslovakia
Daniel Kahneman
Decision theory
Decision-making
Declaration of war
Deliberation
Determination
Dictatorship
Disarmament
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eq_history
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Foreign policy
Foreign policy of the United States
Franklin D. Roosevelt
German occupation of Czechoslovakia
Incrementalism
International relations
International security
Isolationism
Jimmy Carter
Legislation
Level of analysis
Memoir
Morgenthau
Munich Agreement
Nation
Nazi Germany
Nazi Party
Neutral country
Organizational behavior
Philip E. Tetlock
Policy analysis
Political capital
Political psychology
Political science
Political spectrum
Political strategy
Politician
Politics
Prediction
Princeton University Press
Prospect theory
Psychology
Public opinion
Quarantine Speech
Rational choice theory
Rationality
Requirement
Robert Jervis
Satisficing
Strategy
Sumner Welles
Tax
Theory
Thought
Trade-off
Uncertainty
United States Department of State
Warfare
World Politics
World war
World War II
Product details
- ISBN 9780691070742
- Weight: 482g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 22 Oct 2000
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Franklin Roosevelt's intentions during the three years between Munich and Pearl Harbor have been a source of controversy among historians for decades. Barbara Farnham offers both a theory of how the domestic political context affects foreign policy decisions in general and a fresh interpretation of FDR's post-Munich policies based on the insights that the theory provides. Between 1936 and 1938, Roosevelt searched for ways to influence the deteriorating international situation. When Hitler's behavior during the Munich crisis showed him to be incorrigibly aggressive, FDR settled on aiding the democracies, a course to which he adhered until America's entry into the war. This policy attracted him because it allowed him to deal with a serious problem: the conflict between the need to stop Hitler and the domestic imperative to avoid any risk of American involvement in a war. Because existing theoretical approaches to value conflict ignore the influence of political factors on decision-making, they offer little help in explaining Roosevelt's behavior.
As an alternative, this book develops a political approach to decision-making which focuses on the impact that awareness of the imperatives of the political context can have on decision-making processes and, through them, policy outcomes. It suggests that in the face of a clash of central values decision-makers who are aware of the demands of the political context are likely to be reluctant to make trade-offs, seeking instead a solution that gives some measure of satisfaction to all the values implicated in the decision.
Barbara Rearden Farnham is Senior Associate at the Institute of War and Peace Studies.
