A01=G. W. Fitch
account
argument
Author_G. W. Fitch
Category=QD
Category=QDHR
causal reference theory
Counterfactual Circumstance
Definite Descriptions
designator
Disquotation Principle
Donnellan's Distinction
Donnellan’s Distinction
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Fixed Point
John Dean
kind
Kripke's Account
Kripke's Arguments
Kripke's Claim
Kripke's Theory
Kripke's View
kripkes
Kripke’s Account
Kripke’s Arguments
Kripke’s Claim
Kripke’s Theory
Kripke’s View
language and logic
Liar Sentences
Londres Est Jolie
metaphysical necessity
Modal Logic
natural
Natural Kind Terms
Ordinary Proper Names
philosophy of mind
posteriori
Posteriori Truth
Quantified Modal Logic
reference theory in analytic philosophy
rigid
rigid designation
Rigid Designators
Russellian Language
Semantic Referent
Skeptical Argument
Skeptical Solution
Speaker's Referent
Speaker’s Referent
truth
Truth Predicate
view
Wittgenstein interpretation
Product details
- ISBN 9781902683881
- Weight: 453g
- Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 21 Jul 2004
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
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Saul Kripke is one of the most original and creative philosophers writing today. His work has had a tremendous impact on the direction that philosophy has taken in the last thirty years and continues to dominate some of its most fundamental aspects. Given Kripke's importance it is perhaps surprising that there is no introduction to his philosophy available to the general student. This book fills that gap. As much of Kripke's work is highly technical, the book's central aim is to provide clear exposition of Kripke's ideas in a form that is understandable to a beginning readership as well as a commentary on them that more advanced students will find useful. The book begins with a discussion of Kripke's early work on modal logic, which provides the foundation for many of his later philosophical contributions, before examining in detail Kripke's central ideas and arguments contained in Naming and Necessity. In further chapters, Kripke's work on semantic paradoxes and his theory of truth are outlined as well as his controversial interpretation of Wittgenstein's famous private language argument. Kripke's ideas are situated alongside those of his precursors and some of the most important and interesting responses to them are explored. The reader is thus able to appreciate the path-breaking nature of Kripke's contributions, how they have challenged fundamentally traditional interpretations, and how they have sparked some of the most important philosophical debates of recent years.
G. W. Fitch is Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University.
