A01=Michael Colaresi
Author_Michael Colaresi
Category=JPS
Category=JPWS
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
peace studies
political science
Product details
- ISBN 9780815630661
- Weight: 544g
- Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
- Publication Date: 29 Dec 2005
- Publisher: Syracuse University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
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Explains the process whereby countries become locked into long-term international conflicts, and how they can escape that conflict spiral. Why do international situations spiral out of control and into war? Why do conflict finally wind down after years, if not decades, of tension? Various faults in conventional thinking, ranging from relying on indeterminate predictions to ignoring the interaction between domestic and international events, have impeded the explanations for the continuation, escalation, and dampening of rivalry conflict.
In Scare Tactics: The Politics of International Rivalry, Michael P. Colaresi analyzes how domestic institutions and interactions among nations converge to become incentives for either war or peace. Specifically, domestic pressure to continue rivalry and resist capitulating to the ""enemy"" can be exacerbated in situations where elites benefit from fear-mongering, a process Colaresi refers to as ""rivalry outbidding."" When rivalry outbidding becomes fused with pressure to change the status quo, even a risky escalation may be preferable to cooperation or rivalry maintenance. The eventual outcomes of such dynamic two-level pressures, if unchecked, are increased conflict, destruction, and death. Colaresi contends, however, that if leaders can resist pressures to escalate threats and step up rivalries, a deteriorating status quo can instead spur cooperation and peace.
In Scare Tactics: The Politics of International Rivalry, Michael P. Colaresi analyzes how domestic institutions and interactions among nations converge to become incentives for either war or peace. Specifically, domestic pressure to continue rivalry and resist capitulating to the ""enemy"" can be exacerbated in situations where elites benefit from fear-mongering, a process Colaresi refers to as ""rivalry outbidding."" When rivalry outbidding becomes fused with pressure to change the status quo, even a risky escalation may be preferable to cooperation or rivalry maintenance. The eventual outcomes of such dynamic two-level pressures, if unchecked, are increased conflict, destruction, and death. Colaresi contends, however, that if leaders can resist pressures to escalate threats and step up rivalries, a deteriorating status quo can instead spur cooperation and peace.
Michael P. Colaresi is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University. He is the author of several articles on political science.
