Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas's Ethics

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A01=Andrew Pinsent
Aquinas
Aquinas's Account
Aquinas's Claims
Aquinas's Descriptions
Aquinas's Ethics
Aquinas's Texts
Aquinas's Virtue Ethics
Aquinas's Work
Aquinas’s Account
Aquinas’s Claims
Aquinas’s Descriptions
Aquinas’s Ethics
Aquinas’s Texts
Aquinas’s Virtue Ethics
Aquinas’s Work
Aristotelian Counterparts
Author_Andrew Pinsent
autism spectrum research
Category=QDHF
Category=QDTQ
Category=QRAM1
cognition
Cognitive Gifts
Congruous Products
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
humility
Infused Virtues
Intellectual Virtue
interpersonal moral development
Interpersonal Resonance
Joint Attention
Joint Attention Activities
magnanimity
Magnanimous Person
moral psychology
Nicomachean Ethics
non-Aristotelian philosophy
second person relationship
second personal relationship
Second-Person Perspective
second-person virtue interpretation
Servile Fear
social
social cognition theory
ST 2a2ae
Supernatural End
Supernatural Life
Synthetic Picture
Theological Virtues
Thomistic ethics
Vice Versa
Virtue Ethics

Product details

  • ISBN 9780415899949
  • Weight: 360g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 22 Dec 2011
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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Thomas Aquinas devoted a substantial proportion of his greatest works to the virtues. Yet, despite the availability of these texts (and centuries of commentary), Aquinas’s virtue ethics remains mysterious, leaving readers with many unanswered questions.

In this book, Pinsent argues that the key to understanding Aquinas’s approach is to be found in an association between: a) attributes he appends to the virtues, and b) interpersonal capacities investigated by the science of social cognition, especially in the context of autistic spectrum disorder. The book uses this research to argue that Aquinas’s approach to the virtues is radically non-Aristotelian and founded on the concept of second-person relatedness.

To demonstrate the explanatory power of this principle, Pinsent shows how the second-person perspective gives interpretation to Aquinas’s descriptions of the virtues and offers a key to long-standing problems, such as the reconciliation of magnanimity and humility. The principle of second-person relatedness also interprets acts that Aquinas describes as the fruition of the virtues. Pinsent concludes by considering how this approach may shape future developments in virtue ethics.

Andrew Pinsent is Research Director of the Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion, University of Oxford.

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