A01=Alfred R. Mele
Addiction
Affair
Affection
Alternative hypothesis
Anger
Anxiety
Author_Alfred R. Mele
Availability heuristic
Bayesian probability
Behavior
Bias
Biasing
Category=QDTM
Causality
Cherry picking
Confirmation bias
Consideration
Criticism
Disgust
Dissociative identity disorder
Empirical evidence
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Explanation
Extraversion and introversion
Facial expression
Falsity
Grief
Hedonic motivation
Hypothesis
Illustration
Indication (medicine)
Inference
Infidelity
Instance (computer science)
Intention
Irrationality
Jealousy
Kent Bach
Literature
Minimisation (psychology)
Motivation
Neglect
Phenomenon
Philosopher
Philosophy
Pity
Political correctness
Probability
Psychology
Questionnaire
Reason
Relevant cost
Result
Robert Audi
Sadness
Self-deception
Self-esteem
Self-image
Self-schema
Social desirability bias
Social rejection
Spouse
State of affairs (sociology)
Statistical hypothesis testing
Suggestion
Test hypothesis
Theory
Theory of mind
Thought
Uncertainty
Understanding
Value (ethics)
Wishful thinking
Product details
- ISBN 9780691057453
- Weight: 198g
- Dimensions: 140 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 03 Dec 2000
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false.
Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike.
Alfred R. Mele, the William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University, is the author of Irrationality, Springs of Action, and Autonomous Agents. He is the editor of The Philosophy of Action and coeditor of Mental Causation.
