A01=Glenn R. Parker
Adverse selection
Advertising
Appellate court
At Best
Author_Glenn R. Parker
Brand
Bribery
Calculation
Category=JP
Category=QDTQ
Chairman
Civil service
Comparative advantage
Compassion
Competition
Consideration
Consumer
Corruption
Credibility
Customer
Dishonesty
Disincentive
Distrust
Economics
Economist
Election
Employee benefit
Employment
eq_bestseller
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eq_nobargain
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eq_society-politics
Expense
Free rider problem
Honesty
Incentive
Income
Incumbent
Institution
Interpersonal relationship
Job security
Legislation
Legislator
Legislature
Lobbying
Measurement
Member of Congress
Misfeasance
Moral hazard
Nonpartisanism
Opportunism
Opportunity cost
Overdraft
Political corruption
Political party
Political science
Politician
Politics
Pooling (resource management)
Prerogative
Present value
Price premium
Public administration
Public choice
Public policy
Quasi-rent
Rational ignorance
Reputation
Retirement
Supply (economics)
Supreme Court of the United States
Tax
Term of office
Uncertainty
Values education
Voting
Warranty
Product details
- ISBN 9780691117393
- Weight: 425g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 25 Apr 2004
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
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Contrary to what news reports might suggest, the majority of politicians behave ethically and are never subject to investigations. Is this because of the elaborate system of rules Congress has constructed to regulate the conduct of its members as well as the fear of electoral reprisal? Drawing on economic literature on the behavior of firms, Glenn Parker answers no. He argues that members of Congress behave ethnically not because of the fear of punishment but because of their concern for their reputations. He draws parallels between politicians and businesses, since both stand to suffer significantly when accused of wrongdoing. Just as business' poor behavior can cause brand names to be tarnished, prices to plummet, and future business to disappear, dishonest politicians stand to sacrifice the human capital invested in their careers, and premiums for honesty, such as electoral security and prestigious post-elective employment. Parker explores public attitudes toward the behavior of members of Congress and shows how those attitudes shape the way members conduct their professional lives.
Written from the perspective of public choice, this book offers a novel approach to the question of how to keep politicians honest.
Glenn R. Parker is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Purdue Univeristy. He is the author of "Congress and the Rent-Seeking Society".
