Self, Supervenience and Personal Identity
Regular price
€107.99
14 days return policy
Shipping & Delivery
A01=Roland G. Alexander
analytic ontology
Author_Roland G. Alexander
Boyle Charles Law
Category=QD
Chapter III
consciousness studies
Dretske's Analysis
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Explanatory Exclusion
Finger Prints
Generalization Accounts
global supervenience
Impure Reflection
mind-body relation
Narrative Identity
narrative theory
non-eidetic phenomenology
Nonphysical Properties
Nonreductive Physicalism
Personal Identity
personal identity problems
Phantom Limb Syndrome
phenomenological analysis
Pre-reflective Consciousness
Psychic Predicates
Psycho Physical Laws
Psychological Connectedness
Psychological Continuity
Spinal Cords
Strong Supervenience
Subvenient Properties
Supervenient Property
Supervenient Quality
supervenient self theory in philosophy
trope theory
Weak Supervenience
Product details
- ISBN 9781138366275
- Weight: 490g
- Dimensions: 152 x 219mm
- Publication Date: 20 May 2019
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
Secure
checkout
Fast Shipping
Easy returns
First published in 1997, this volume addresses the issue of personal identity by examining the possibility that a person is ascribed identity on the basis of having a supervenient self. Ronald G. Alexander uses the methods of non-eidetic phenomenology and analytic ontology to argue that the self is supervenient on the physical and psychological properties of the human being. Understood through the manner Alexander advocates, the self is not a statis entity, but reflects the temporal nature of the person. Alexander argues that the self is the ‘pattern’, ‘character’, or ‘narrative identity’ that is the outcome of a person’s decision-making and actions.
R. Alexander
