Signaling Games in Political Science
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A01=Jeffery S. Banks
agenda control models
asymmetric information theory
Author_Jeffery S. Banks
Category=JP
Category=KC
Category=KJ
Category=QDTS
Condorcet Winner
costless
Costless Signaling
Electoral Announcements
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
equilibrium
incomplete
Incomplete Information Games
information
Informative Equilibria
institutional design theory
legislative bargaining
Negative Relationship
political decision making
pooling
Pooling Equilibria
positive
Posterior Belief
probability
pure
sequential
Sequential Equilibrium
Signaling Games
Spence Model
strategic communication in politics
strategies
voting behaviour analysis
Product details
- ISBN 9781138178489
- Weight: 204g
- Dimensions: 129 x 198mm
- Publication Date: 07 Feb 2017
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
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First Published in 1991. This monograph surveys the current literature on game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics. Such work generalises earlier models by allowing relevant information to be asymmetrically held by agents, and subsequently studying the willingness and ability of these agents to transmit information through their actions. The monograph includes models of agenda control in legislatures and elections, veto threats and debate, electoral competition, regulation building, bargaining in the shadow of war and sophisticated voting. Within each topic the principal focus is on how the presence of asymmetric information enriches the strategic environment of the participants as well as how it rationalises certain types of political behavior and political institutions as equilibrium phenomena in an 'incomplete information' world.
Jeffrey S. Banks, University of Rochester, New York, USA., J. Ferejohn, Stanford University, California.
