Signalling Games in Political Science
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A01=J. Banks
agenda setting models
Author_J. Banks
Category=KCP
Chain Store Paradox
Complete Information Games
Complete Informativeness
Condorcet Winner
costless
Costless Signaling
Crisis Bargaining
crisis negotiation tactics
Debate Stage
Electoral Announcements
electoral strategy analysis
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
equilibrium
Equilibrium Behavior
Equilibrium Path
incomplete
Incomplete Information Games
incomplete information voting behaviour
information
Informative Equilibria
leadership signalling
Median Voter
Negative Relationship
political information asymmetry
Pooling Equilibria
positive
Posterior Beliefs
Potential Entrants
probability
pure
Pure Strategies
Sender Types
sequential
Sequential Equilibria
signaling
Signaling Game
Spence Model
Stage Voters
Status Quo Outcome
strategic communication theory
strategies
Uninformed Players
Product details
- ISBN 9780415269469
- Weight: 249g
- Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 06 Dec 2001
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
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Considers the impact of game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics paying particular attention to the presence of information asymmetries.
