South Asia's Nuclear Security

Regular price €67.99
Quantity:
In stock with our UK publisher. 14-28 days
Delivery/Collection within 10-20 working days
14 days return policy Shipping & Delivery
A01=Bhumitra Chakma
Arms Control Initiatives
arsenal
Author_Bhumitra Chakma
building
Category=JBSL
Category=JPS
Category=JPSF
Category=JWMN
Category=NHTB
Complex Deterrence
deterrence
Deterrence Diplomacy
Deterrence Failure
Deterrence Structure
eq_bestseller
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
failure
fissile material security
force
indo-pakistani
Indo-Pakistani arms race
Intact Nuclear Weapon
minimum
Minimum Deterrence
minimum deterrence policy
Minimum Deterrence Posture
nuclear arms control
nuclear deterrence theory
Nuclear Force Building
Nuclear Revolution
nuclear risk management in South Asia
Nuclear Security
Nuclear Terrorism
Nuclear Weapons
Preventive Strike
Radical Pessimists
Region's Nuclear Security
regional conflict escalation
Regional Deterrence
Regional Nuclear Deterrence
Region’s Nuclear Security
revolution
South Asia's Nuclear
South Asia's Nuclear Deterrence
South Asia's Nuclear Security
South Asian Security Dilemma
South Asia’s Nuclear Deterrence
Stable Deterrence
states
Tv Address
weapons

Product details

  • ISBN 9780815358053
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 22 Dec 2017
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Inc
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Paperback
Secure checkout Fast Shipping Easy returns

South Asia is often viewed as a potential nuclear flashpoint and a probable source of nuclear terrorism. But, how valid are such perceptions? This book seeks to address this question and assesses the region’s nuclear security from two principal standpoints. First, it evaluates the robustness of the Indo-Pakistani mutual deterrence by analysing the strength and weaknesses of the competing arguments regarding the issue. It also analyses the causes and consequences of nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, the nature of deterrence structure in the region and the challenges of confidence building and arms control between the two countries in order to assess the robustness of South Asia’s nuclear deterrence. Second, it assesses the safety and security of the nuclear assets and nuclear infrastructure of India and Pakistan. The author holds that the debate on South Asia’s nuclear security is largely misplaced because the optimists tend to overemphasise the stabilising effects of nuclear weapons and the pessimists are too alarmists. It is argued that while the risks of nuclear weapons are significant, it is unlikely that India and Pakistan will give up their nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future. Therefore, what needs to happen is that while nuclear elimination should be the long-term goal, in the interim years the two countries need to pursue minimum deterrence policies to reduce the likelihood of deterrence failure and the possibility of obtaining fissile materials by non-state actors.

Bhumitra Chakma is Senior Lecturer in the School of Politics, Philosophy, and International Studies and Director of the South Asia Project at Hull University, UK

More from this author