State Capacity, Economic Control, and Authoritarian Elections

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A01=Merete Seeberg
Administrative Capacity
Administrative Capacity Conditions
Affect Regime Stability
Author_Merete Seeberg
authoritarian
Authoritarian Capacities
Authoritarian Elections
Authoritarian Regime Breakdown
authoritarian regime electoral outcomes
Authoritarian Regime Stability
Authoritarian Regime Type
autocratic governance
autocratization
Category=JPHF
Category=JPHV
Coercive Capacity
comparative politics
Country Fixed Effects Models
democratisation processes
democratization
Economic Control Condition
elections
Electoral Authoritarian Regimes
Electoral Authoritarianism
Electoral Autocracies
Elite Defections
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
High Capacity Regime
MDC Supporter
Merete Bech Seeberg
Military Expenditure
multi-party competition effects
Multi-party Elections
NGO Statistic
Non-electoral Regimes
Philippines
political institutions analysis
Post-electoral Protests
Regime Breakdown
regime stability
Ruling Front
UMNO Baru
Zimbabwe

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367592295
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 14 Aug 2020
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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Although the phenomenon of authoritarian elections has been a focal point for the literature on authoritarian institutions for more than a decade, our understanding of the effect of authoritarian elections is still limited.

Combining evidence from cross-national studies with studies on selected cases relying on recent field work, this book suggests a solution to the "paradox of authoritarian elections". Rather than focusing on authoritarian elections as a uniform phenomenon, it focuses on the differing conditions under which authoritarian elections occur. It demonstrates that the capacities available to authoritarian rulers shape the effect of elections and high levels of state capacity and control over the economy increase the probability that authoritarian multi-party elections will stabilize the regime. Where these capacities are limited, the regime is more likely to succumb in the face of elections. The findings imply that although multi-party competition and state strength may be important prerequisites for democracy, they can under some circumstances obstruct democratization by preventing the demise of dictatorships.

This text will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners of democratization, and to those who study autocracy and electoral authoritarianism, as well as comparative politics more broadly.

Merete Bech Seeberg is Assitant Professor at Aarhus University, Denmark.

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