Strange Stability

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A01=Benjamin Wilson
arms control
arms development
arms race
Author_Benjamin Wilson
Category=JPSF
Category=JWMN
Category=NH
Category=PDX
cold war
cold war science
Daniel Ellsberg The Doomsday Machine
defense contractors
defense intellectuals
defense policy
defense research
defense technology
eq_bestseller
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_new_release
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_science
eq_society-politics
Fred Kaplan The Wizards of Armageddon
international security
John Lewis Gaddis Strategies of Containment
Lawrence Freedman The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy
Lynn Eden Whole World on Fire
military ideology
military planning
military research
military science
military strategy
military technology
military-industrial complex
military-scientific complex
mutual assured destruction
nuclear defense
nuclear deterrence
nuclear planning
nuclear policy
nuclear proliferation
nuclear research
nuclear strategy
nuclear theory
nuclear weapons
pentagon
Richard Rhodes The Making of the Atomic Bomb
scientific advisors
scientific elite
strategic analysis
strategic doctrine
strategic stability
strategic studies
strategic theory
strategic thinking
weapons development

Product details

  • ISBN 9780674976085
  • Dimensions: 156 x 235mm
  • Publication Date: 18 Nov 2025
  • Publisher: Harvard University Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Hardback
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An eye-opening reconsideration of the Cold War arms control movement, showing how scientists who presented themselves as independent-minded opponents of the arms race in fact functioned as agents of the military-industrial complex that profited from it.

Do scientists speak truth to power? During the Cold War, a group of elite American strategists and science advisors claimed to do precisely that. Styling themselves as figures of rationality and restraint, they insisted that mutual assured destruction was the natural logic of the atomic age: as long as nuclear deterrence was credible, no one would ever shoot first. This doctrine, known as “strategic stability,” became the foundation of the arms control movement, earning its promoters widespread admiration as independent thinkers and steadfast peacemakers. But in this crucial counterhistory, Benjamin Wilson shows that we have misunderstood them and their efforts. Arms controllers, he reveals, worked not to restrain the nuclear arms race but to marginalize more radical approaches to disarmament.

As Wilson makes clear, strategic stability was never the objective condition the analysts presented it as. It was a flexible, contested metaphor based on ideas from physics, economics, and cybernetics, capable of justifying a wide range of policies. Yet the advisors insisted on one upshot above all: constant military research and development and the continuous upgrading of America’s strategic arsenal. That these policies benefited the military-industrial complex is no surprise, since many arms control thinkers were creatures of the Pentagon and corporate defense contractors. Some even spoke out against missile development in public while backing lavish funding behind closed doors.

Strange Stability powerfully corrects decades of mythmaking surrounding arms control. At the same time, Wilson offers a sobering reflection on the dream of technocratic restraint. The well-placed insider who resists powerful institutions is an enticing character, but more fictional than real.

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