Strategic Behavior and the United States Unfair Trade Statutes
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A01=Jeffrey W. Steagall
anti-dumping investigations
Antidumping Statutes
Author_Jeffrey W. Steagall
Category=JP
Category=KC
Category=KCC
Category=KJ
Countervailable Subsidies
countervailing duties
Cumulative Distribution Function
CVD
CVD Case
CVD Investigation
Determination Function
Dummy Variables
Dumping Margin
econometric modelling
empirical study of trade remedies
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Firm's Strategic Behavior
Firm's Strategic Incentives
Firm’s Strategic Behavior
Firm’s Strategic Incentives
Home Firm
Import Penetration Ratio
international trade policy
ITC Determination
LRT Statistic
Material Injury
material injury analysis
OLS Regression
Optimal Subsidy
Reaction Curve
Strategic Behavior
Strategic Period
Subsidized Imports
Title VII
trade law enforcement
Unfair Trade Laws
West Germany
Product details
- ISBN 9781138104327
- Weight: 620g
- Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
- Publication Date: 12 Oct 2017
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
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This book, first published in 1995, analyses both theoretically and empirically the effects of a material injury clause of the type found in the Trade Act of 1979 on the behaviour of the dumping or subsidised foreign and import-competing domestic industries. The insight underlying the investigation is that the existence of such a material injury clause in an unfair trade law presents a moral hazard for representatives of the industry because it implies that tariff protection is more likely when the ITC perceives the injury to the US industry to be greater. Therefore, an incentive exists for the US industry to let itself be (or appear to be) injured today in order to benefit from tariff protection in the future.
